Theorizing Global Citizenship: Discourses, Challenges, and Implications for Education
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Abstract:

The increasing interconnection between countries is leading to the recognition of both shared problems and shared solutions for which citizens’ rights, obligations, and responsibilities transcend the traditional nation-state. This article seeks to provide an understanding of the concept of global citizenship and to locate the main contemporary proponents of this concept. It identifies four different themes underlying global citizenship, which are then labeled as world culture, new-era realism, corporate citizenship, and planetary vessel. After discussing the assumptions and arguments in favor of global citizenship made by the proponents within each of the four themes, the article examines several ideological and material obstacles to the attainment of a global citizenship. Global citizenship is found to require significant adjustment of individual, corporate, national, and regional interests. The implications of this concept for the K-12 curriculum, especially civic education, are probed.

Introduction

The continuous flow of people, transactions, and capital driven by globalization has resulted in new transnational obligations and rights. As social and economic issues, problems, and solutions reach global scale, the concept of global citizenship is attaining great currency, and is endorsed by a large and varied group of actors, from governments and business firms to grassroots organizations and political philosophers. Indeed, there are growing perceptions that citizenship is tied to democracy, and that global citizenship should in some way be tied to global democracy (Falk, 1994; Carter, 2001). Thus, the notion of global citizenship, simple at first if merely conceptualized as an extension of national citizenship to the transnational level, ultimately brings us into a complex, multidimensional world, with varying definitions and many national interests at cross-purposes.

Meanings of citizenship abound. It can denote a legal status, identification with the state, a sense of belonging to a community, membership as equal among others, an entitlement to make claims against the state, or an ongoing social practice. Further, it has been seen as alternately compulsory or voluntary, active or passive, broadly moral or strictly legal (Prokhovnick, 1998; see also, Sassen, 2006). In any case, there is consensus that citizenship is based on principles of equality. However, it is precisely this sense of egalitarian status among members that often creates an exclusionary set of protective rights against others, i.e., aliens or foreigners (Turner, 1986).

In recent years, the concept of global citizenship has attained widespread use, and such use comes from multiple sources. The literature on global citizenship has given little attention to “power geometries”—the ways that individuals, social groups, places, and regions are differently
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situated in the flows and interconnections we label collectively as globalization (Massey, cited in Sidhu, 2007, p. 212). Yet, the discussion of global citizenship is occurring in a context in which the traditional nation-state is less autonomous in the globalized system, being penetrated by a variety of transnational forces. In this new situation, weak states in particular evince less autonomy and greater social fragmentation (Holsti, 2002). A paradox of globalization has been the expanding international consensus in favor of democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights, even as accompanied by growing economic inequalities, environmental threats, and what some call “unprecedented human suffering” (de Oliveira & Tandon, c1995).

This article discusses the meanings of the concept of “global citizenship” and seeks to identify the contemporary proponents of its use. Subsequently, it considers the array of obstacles to making real a global citizenship and discusses the implications for schooling and, particularly, civic education. The article marshals contributions from the sociological, political science, and international relations literature as well as those from popular culture (as represented in the mainstream media and the Internet) on the topic. Four questions provide the study’s focus:

1. In what ways is global citizenship being defined? What assumptions about political life underlie these definitions and what normative arguments are being made in favor of a global society?
2. Who are the proponents advocating the notion of global citizenship?
3. What are challenges to the attainment of global citizenship in contemporary societies?
4. What are the implications for education, specifically the K-12 curriculum, and the potential of civic education in promoting global citizenship?

Defining Global Citizenship

The meanings of global citizenship move along a continuum, from vague language like “we are all members of the human race,” “we are responsible for conditions of the planet,” and “all individual subjects are subject to moral law,” to more precise formulations such as: “We should promote the establishment of a world government.”

Some definitions of global citizenship emphasize the individual dimension; thus, McIntosh (2005) describes it as the ability to see oneself and the world around one, the ability to make comparisons and contrasts, the ability to “see plurally”, the ability to understand that both “reality” and language come in multiple versions, the ability to see power relations and understand them systematically, and the ability to balance awareness of one’s own realities with the realities of entities outside the perceived self. One could add to this list the demonstration of concern for the rights and welfare of others (Ladson-Billings, 2005). Other definitions underscore the question of multiple rights and refer to “intercultural citizenship,” defined as “recognizing rights and status of different subgroups, divided also by gender, ethnic, linguistic and religious lines” (Leung & Lee, 2006, p. 26). In this perspective, there are also skills and responsibilities that involve the willingness to participate in politics at local, national, and international levels, the ability to be sensitive toward and to defend human rights, and the capacity to approach problems as a member of a global society (Kubow et al., as cited in Leung & Lee, 2006, p. 26). Complicating this issue is the permitting—and even promoting—of dual citizenship by many countries today, which raises questions about both identity and citizenship. Nussbaum (2002)
argues in favor of a “cosmopolitan citizenship,” which would cut across national loyalties.

Arneil (2006) distinguishes two threads in the concept of citizenship, one democratic, in which the principle of participation prevails, the other liberal, in which the principle of individual rights prevails. She then proposes a definition of global citizenship that does not imply sharing common values, fearing that the consensus to form such a cosmopolitan citizenship could result in cultural imperialism, with the strongest countries dictating what the values should be. She argues that global citizenship be conceptualized as the possession of a common fate. Quoting Williams, Arneil says, “We find ourselves in webs of relationships with other human beings that profoundly shape our lives, whether or not we consciously choose or voluntarily assert to be enmeshed in these webs.” The advantage of seeing global citizenship as the sharing of a common fate is that it turns attention away from the notions of both charity and formal contracts between countries, and toward the question of the global distribution of resources, rights, and responsibilities. Another definition, quite common and accessible through Wikipedia, states that global citizenship implies a level of moral good will in the foreign policy of states. Curiously, this is one of the few definitions that touch on an ethical dimension.

It must be remembered that global citizenship does not denote a legal status since there is no formal authority regulating it. Rather, it is expressed associatively, through informal ties and the adoption of “transnational norms and status that defy national boundaries and sovereignty” (Lagos, 2002, p. 4). In this view, global citizenship is not the result of rights and obligations granted by a central authority, but rather a bottom-up movement most often effected through grassroots activism. In the context of international relations, the so-called idealist school, which is based on the principle of equal respect for all states, would connect global citizenship to a nation-state’s responsibility to act with an awareness of the world as a global community. Such responsibility would be strictly voluntary, however, because global citizenship bears no legal relation to the nation-state; the implementation of rights and responsibilities would require a body politic outside the conventional state—in other words, a global institution with legal mandate and capacity to sanction.

**Explaining the Emergence of Global Citizenship**

What accounts for the current salience of the concept of global citizenship? After reading the varied literature on the subject, I have identified four prevailing discourses that help understand what accounts for the salience of global citizenship and whose features are outlined in Table 1. While proponents of global citizenship often invoke the concept, it is more often strategically utilized than explicitly defined.

**World Culture**

This discourse is based on sociological perspectives and is attentive to cultural and, primarily, educational patterns. It argues that educational systems should not be seen as closed systems but rather as institutions highly influenced by external actors, either through mere imitation (mimetic responses) or by normative principles (widespread ideas of what is proper). From a world-culture perspective, a global culture is emerging, a culture characterized by diversity but also by a commonality in the recognition of the centrality of human rights. Changes in cultural values and norms throughout the world have brought human rights as a concept and as a movement to the fore. The contemporary concern with human rights is seen as the
product of political and cultural globalization that emphasizes human rights over and above national citizenship rights, and assigns centrality to the individual person over and above nation-states (Meyer et al., 1997; Ramirez et al., 2006; Suárez, 2007). Two key empirical indicators of the salience of human rights used by these authors are the explosive growth in the number of human rights organizations, and the number of human rights articles in the popular press across the world since the 1980s. Additional evidence of the steady progression in the recognition of human rights as a concept is the existence of 25 international agreements on human rights signed since 1926 (Ilgen, 2003).

While traditional citizenship grants legal rights on the basis of the individual’s birth or residence in a particular nation-state, human rights imply the recognition of rights inherent to human beings regardless of territory. Since this framework is not directly linked to the state,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>World culture</th>
<th>New-era realism</th>
<th>Corporate citizenship</th>
<th>Planetary vessel</th>
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<tr>
<td>Proponents of the concept</td>
<td>Multiple social actors and institutions</td>
<td>Dominant nation-states</td>
<td>Major TNCs</td>
<td>Coalitions of NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental perspective</td>
<td>Sociological</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key objectives of its proponents</td>
<td>No political objective; cultural and democratic norms expand naturally</td>
<td>Creation of a political order led by US</td>
<td>Gain legitimacy for corporate actors</td>
<td>Recognition and solution of global problems</td>
</tr>
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<td>Driving force</td>
<td>Diffusion of ideas</td>
<td>To mask self-interest as essential</td>
<td>To mask self-interest as democratic</td>
<td>To solve perceived global problems</td>
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<td>Values emphasized</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>Order and control</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
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<td>Envisaged governance</td>
<td>Assumes a stateless global order</td>
<td>Avoids global governance; US hegemony</td>
<td>Avoids global governance; US hegemony</td>
<td>New global governance mechanisms essential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries of global citizenship</td>
<td>Entire world society</td>
<td>US and to some extent its European allies</td>
<td>US and to some extent other industrialized countries</td>
<td>People, especially poor people, throughout the world</td>
</tr>
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Table 1.
Alternative Frames in the Conceptualization of Global Citizenship
individual rights become defined and defended in natural law terms, as reflected in several UN declarations of human rights. These rights, political and cultural, are rights of persons framed and theorized as universal in scope (Ramirez, 2006). This contrasts with conventional notions of national citizenship, which are rooted in national constitutional law (Ramirez et al., 2006). Turner (1986) believes that a major reason for the universalization of human rights in contemporary times is that it appeals to, and is based upon, a feature shared by all humans: our vulnerability to all kinds of harm.

Proponents of the world-culture perspective hold that the world itself is increasingly imagined as a community; they argue that international organizations and social movements are empirical evidence of this nascent world community (Ramirez, 2006). According to this perspective, world models or blueprints of progress and justice give rise to increasingly standardized nation-states, organizations, and individuals. In this dynamic process, education is seen as playing an enormous role in the production of equality and cooperation, and the educational expansion characterizing all modern states is seen as an indication that human rights shape and justify this expansion, as, in the end, the human person becomes more central to democracy than the national citizen (Ramirez et al., 2006).

World-culture discourse recognizes the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the diffusion of values related to social justice, democracy, and human rights. But these groups are seen as only one element in a much wider configuration of agents since new ideas about global citizenship are also seen as products of the circulation of intellectuals and technical experts who contribute to the growth of commonalities, or “institutional isomorphism” (a phenomenon first detected by DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). National states and national legal systems are seen as the main examples of influential sources of institutional isomorphism. In the world-culture model of global citizenship, explanations based on power are downplayed. Far from recognizing asymmetric relationships, such as the dependency of developing countries on highly industrialized countries, it argues that nation-states and national educational structures operate as “open systems”. These “open systems” are subject to exogenous influences, to be sure, but these influences are not ordered in terms of their relative strength. The view of world-culture model proponents is not that power influences do not exist, but that the mimetic and normative processes are, by far, greater sources of change. Concomitantly, the world-culture model posits an increasingly integrated but stateless world society which directly and indirectly expands human rights education (Ramirez et al., 2006).

The failure to visualize a system of global governance in world-culture theories is a source of considerable weakness. As Jelin (1997) observes, two complementary dynamics are involved in the development of citizenship (which we can extend to the development of a global citizenship): the learning of rights and obligations, and the development of democratic institutional frameworks. In her view, the interplay between these two forces creates links between human rights and citizenship. Applied to the fostering of a global citizenship, the establishment of global democratic institutions would seem essential to attain the ends of worldwide understanding and harmony.

New-Era Realism

This discourse continues the line of thought endorsed by the realist school in international relations and centers on a superpower
promoting the idea of global citizenship. It holds that while traditional empires defended themselves with a realpolitik logic—rooted in the exercise of national interests of self-interested parties—today this naked self-concern has become replaced by a “liberal imperial power, which seeks to create an empire governed by a single set of universal moral laws (Arneil, 2006). From this perspective, endorsement of the global citizenship idea represents a return to the colonial “civilizing mission” of the past (Arneil, 2006).

The disappearance of the communist threat makes it unnecessary for the U.S. to compete with other countries for the support of many Third World countries and, at the same time, renders the U.S. a hegemon in the international arena. The tenets of new-era realism assume: the U.S. as the key global actor and the centrality its military power, the U.S. as a force for good around the globe, optimism about U.S. capabilities, a reluctance to enter into agreements or accords with other countries, and the supremacy of the U.S. in the world (Mann, 2004, pp. 362-363). The existence of this perspective is reflected in a number of practices. For several decades, U.S. policies have relied on the metaphor of the “rogue state,” meaning one that does not respect international laws and is willing to attack its neighbors. Stephen Krasner (2004), an academician who served as the director of policy planning at the State Department, proposed the notion of “collapsed” and “failed states,” and energized the concept of “rogue states” (North Korea, Iraq, Cuba, Iran, Libya)—notions that have significantly shaped the foreign policy of the U.S. Since 2005, the influential Foreign Policy journal, in combination with the Fund for Peace, has produced a list of “failed states.” This concept, now visible in a number of college textbooks, has been found to create an illness narrative that closes discussion of alternative policies in dealing with such states (Manjikian, 2008). Given “failed states,” which cannot control their territory and population and establish order within their boundaries, the only option seems to be to deny their status as independent nation-states.

During the G.W. Bush administration, a new U.S. national security strategy was implemented according to which, “the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively” against other nations—primarily “rogue states” and those harboring “terrorists”—because of potential rather than imminent threats to its security (Bush, 2006, p. 271). The same strategy assumed a global scope by stating, “The U.S. must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere” (p. 262, emphasis added). According to a declaration by then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in June 2005, “Now, we [the U.S.] are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people” [emphasis added]. This discourse made democracy a global objective, yet only where the U.S. was to be a prime agent in its enforcement as well as in the very act of defining a democratic regime.

New categories have been also assigned to the 29 post-communist states, which are described as either “fragile” or “consolidated.” Krasner (2004) argues that weak and inefficient states do not deserve to enjoy sovereignty. Expressing concern that “sovereignty failures” may end up providing fertile territory for terrorists and criminals that engage in drug trafficking, Krasner argues for the provision of “governance assistance” via new institutional options such as “de-facto trusteeships and shared sovereignty” (p. 99). Most often, this has been subsumed under the strategy of “regime change.” An additional category affecting our view of the “other” is “terrorism.” As Brzezinski (2007) notes, terrorism “defines neither a geographical context nor our presumed
enemies” (p. 6P). This notion, not being directly linked to a nation-state, opens the way for global action. On the other hand, since “terrorism” sets a clear dichotomy between “normal” citizens and those who are not “normal”, it makes it difficult to imagine a shared notion of citizenship.

These negative characterizations of many states do not bode well for the concept of global citizenship. Democracy connotes equalization of rights, which comes through equalization of membership. In contrast, new-era realism is based on a hierarchy of nations. Can global citizenship be possible given the large international exclusion of countries? To this differentiation in status among states, one must also add the categorizations popular in the globalization discourse: “losers” and “winners.” Obviously, those in charge of restoring sovereignty to the “failed states” would be the industrialized countries, and it is doubtful that the residents of the collapsed and failed states would be seen as global citizens.4

Envisaging a better world, philosopher John Rawls argues that richer countries should apply redistributive principles within their own populations, and that these countries have only a moral duty to assist poorer countries. This view has been criticized by Benhabib (2006) for not recognizing that the North’s wealth is inextricably tied to the South’s poverty. The realist perspective and its current incarnation imply that “a consistent set of moral principles cannot be applied in the context of international politics” (Carter, 2001, p. 181), because the pursuit of national interests is often first priority. Consequently, this perspective would leave a minimal role for a robust and democratic global citizenship. Indeed, one clear manifestation of the reluctance of the U.S. to share political power is reflected in the continued weakening of the U.N. and the restrictive participation in high-level decision-making embodied first in the G-7 and now (with the entrance of Russia) in the G-8. Indeed, the intensification of capitalist relations, evinced in the strong market competition between countries, has led to the formation of regional economic blocs, both to create larger markets and to provide mutual support within regional markets. The most salient examples are the European Union (EU), the North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These projects of regional integration introduce structures of trans-national political governance, granting economic and social rights to their members (Carter, 2001). These agreements are focused more on corporations than individuals as possessors of rights and duties. In regards to the EU, Carter (2001) asks whether the emergence of European citizenship is a bridge or a barrier to global citizenship. The same question could be extended to the other regional economic blocs. Is the self-protection of a particular geographic bloc conducive to the development of global community? Would not regional rights exclude those not belonging to the same region?

Dower and Williams (2002) consider that international government organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) constitute key actors in global governance. However, it would be appropriate to recognize that the most influential bodies are those with a strong economic component—the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. For those with limited financial resources, political efforts to create a universalistic view of citizenship, such as through the League of Nations and the U.N., have generally been less successful (Turner, 1986). The EU represents a more successful form of transnational citizenship, but this union was prompted by the urgent need
to prevent further wars on the continent, and is backed by a strong economic necessity: a competitive size in the international marketplace.

**Corporate Citizenship**

Based on economic grounds there is a discourse, proposed by business corporations, that posits them as new citizens in the global scene. It has been observed that capitalism does not respect national borders (Sampaio, 2004), and that advanced capitalism proposes a kind of consumerist global citizenship (Braidotti, 2007). Transnational liberalism is sponsored by governing elites, and informed by principles of trade liberalization and comparative advantage. There are about 37,000 transnational corporations (TNCs) globally, and they are recognized as new centers of economic and political power, with complex relations of rivalry and collusion with nation-states (Emadi-Coffin, 2002).

Empirically, it can be verified that the notion of global citizenship is very much present among TNCs, such as Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, and Seagate Technology. From their perspective, explicitly expressed in these firms’ advertisements and websites, global citizenship follows from being responsive to client needs and acting responsibly toward them. Abbott Laboratories (a global firm specializing in pharmaceutical and medical products and with more than $30 billion in sales per year), for instance, states in its corporate self-presentation that “global citizenship is fundamentally about building this trust [between firm and client].” Abbott Laboratories has produced a Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Index, which includes indicators on “economic performance, environmental practices, labor practices and decent work, human rights, social order, and product responsibility” (Abbott, 2006)—a curious mix of ethical and profit concerns.

Efficiency and utilitarianism are essential parts of capitalism. The growing standardization of economic norms and procedures around the world calls for the participation of various organizations, most of them non-elected bodies, to set criteria for the quality of multiple services and products. To the extent that these standards affect the practices of individuals, standardization is increasingly influencing the conception of citizenship. The concern raised by some observers is that this form of global citizenship may be closer to a “consumer” model than a legal one (Lagos, 2002, p. 9).

The emergence of corporate firms as new global citizens is fostered by globalization, which has enabled a high concentration of economic and technological power in developed countries. Such changes have been accompanied by an enormous amount of legal innovation (Sassen, 2000). The current World Trade Organization (WTO) espouses new legally binding procedures and creates a de-facto citizenship for the commercial firms under its supervision. The WTO is based around the economic power of a few powerful states and blocs supported by their own interest groups rather than on a collective agreement of all member states. In addition, there are myriad new privatized, legal regimes that conduct cross-border business transactions and that, through private policies, affect public governance, one of the most prevalent being the ISO standards that increasingly apply to varying organizations in all parts of the world. They include agencies that produce credit ratings to orient investments in the international capital market, as well as those that produce regulations and provide arbitration (Sassen, 2000; Cutler et al., cited in Vayrynen, 2002). Privileged rights of citizenship are now being conferred on various forms of corporate capital, notably the TNCs. Through the WTO, substantial power to legislate is placed in the hands of industrialized states. This new reality
is also called a “new constitutionalism”—“the sets of regulations, laws, policies and practices animated by neoliberal ideas and values” (Sidhu, 2007, p. 207) that result in a governance embedded in non-elected international bodies. These enterprises acquire not only de-facto citizenship status, but also multiple nationalities based both on the country of incorporation and the places where they conduct their business. The rise of the WTO has also seen what has been termed disciplinary neoliberalism, defined as “a reciprocal process that involves the production and organization of knowledge, policies, and practices according to neoliberal principles, and the use of such neoliberal knowledge and instrumentalities to regulate, shape, and steer the behavior of individuals in the social body” (Sidhu, 2007, p. 207). To deregulate (which permits the emergence of new and powerful private economic actors), national governments must implement detailed policy packages. So what often obtains is not a reduction in governmental policy-making but a reformulation of policies, and often, continued government intervention in the economy (Emadi-Coffin, 2002). This time, however, the influence of external economic actors becomes more powerful than before.

Falk (1994) argues that members of “the transnational business elite” have become preeminent social actors. He is critical of these individuals, however, noting that this elite gives up “the particularity of traditional citizenship and yet never acquires a sense of global community and accompanying social responsibility” (p. 140). Carter (2001) supports Falk’s assessment. She argues that globalization in its present form does not favor global citizenship because TNCs influence national governments and international bodies to act on their interests and to thereby acquire more power than that held by individuals with citizenship. Under this model, one key right of citizenship—freedom of movement—is effectively limited to financial capital and highly skilled professionals (Carter, 2001). All of these economic and legal dynamics are forcing governments throughout the world to adjust constantly to what is identified as “international standards”; and such dynamics are contributing to what Sassen (2006) terms “a disarticulation of territory and authority” (p. 411). A particular feature linked to the insertion of TNCs in the political arena is the widespread emergence of “soft laws,” which leave a large amount of discretion to the party bound by the obligation, so regulations become discretionary in nature, especially referring to codes of conduct of TNCs (Emadi-Coffin, 2002). Consequently, it can be seen that, while advanced capitalism incorporates the notion of a global citizenship, there has been a concomitant tendency to fit policies and practices into the kind of ongoing uniformity dictated by the most powerful market actors, the TNCs.

Planetary Vessel

This discourse, emanating from grassroots groups, holds that with the increased mobility of products and people, much of public policy must look at problems of greater magnitude than ever before, moving into the realm of global problems. The planetary vessel discourse acknowledges rising world concern for universal human rights, but it also recognizes the explosion of new global problems cutting across national boundaries, such as health, peace, environmental degradation and global warming, and safety. These problems are seen as greatly affecting disadvantaged groups such as indigenous populations and women (Lagos, 2002; World Social Forum, 2009).

This new global context has generated the involvement of non-state actors, particularly NGOs, to put pressure on their respective governments to be more sensitive to such global concerns and to respond to them in coordinated
ways. These groups are often recognized as elements of global civil society; notable among them are: Amnesty International, organizations of the women’s movement such as DAWN, WEDO, and ISIS, and “green” activists such as Friends of the Earth, World Wildlife Fund, and the Asian Pacific People’s Environmental Network.

The principle that brings these varying groups into action is: “We are in this together.” Philosopher Rosi Braidotti (2007) considers that these groups are attempting to develop a pan-humanist position based on horizons of hope, and that they are relying on “the condition of possibility,” by adopting such values as African humanism or ubuntu, or the notion of planetary environmentalism proposed by the Indian biologist Vandana Shiva. Braidotti argues that NGOs propose “affirmative ethics,” or an affirmative mode of intervention on the world. She sees the new situated ethics building on feminist and environmental concerns. A complementary view is held by Carter (2001), who maintains that a cosmopolitan morality need not be tied to nation-state membership.

Human rights is the issue around which the largest number of transnational social movements mobilize at present (Tarrow, 2005), but other important concerns receive attention as well. Data on the objectives pursued by transnational social movements, derived from 600 international NGOs (1993 Yearbook of International Organizations, as cited in Scherer-Warren, 1999, p. 68), indicate that the majority of these institutions work for human rights (26 percent), followed by environmental concerns (15 percent), women’s concerns (9 percent), peace (9 percent), world order (8 percent), development (6 percent), and self-determination/ethnicity (5 percent). Well-known groups working on human rights are Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Conceptually, the notion of human rights is upheld as a framework for pursuing development goals in a sustainable and fair manner (Sen, 1999). From the perspective of citizenship, human rights are the most universalized rights of the citizen and are thus considered the “cornerstone of the transnational conception of citizenship” (Baubock, 1994, p. 240). Large numbers of people interviewed in the 1993 World Values Survey believe that issues such as the environment, immigration, and development are best dealt with by international institutions (cited in Tarrow, 2005). These issues, along with human rights, would seem to provide a strong bridge between national and transnational concerns. It is commonly argued that human rights have their roots in ethics and that this implies a single moral community. But several observers are less optimistic, noting that “the diversity of cultures makes it impossible to conceive human rights as firmly grounded in universally shared cultural meanings” (Baubock, 1994, p. 240; Arneil, 2006).

Much of the effort behind the “We are in this together” banner is carried by the work of international and national NGOs. As a whole, these groups consider that new forms of global governance are both necessary and possible. Their efforts have been greatly aided by the ease of information transmission and development of networks made possible by communication and information technologies (Tarrow, 2005). But diffusion of information and activism on crucial global issues are only two elements of citizenship. The power to influence decisions is not always possible through activism. Furthermore, it must be noted that these transnational efforts and organized movements produce global intents but no global mechanisms to set and enforce universal norms. An important example concerns gender issues. There is a convention, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), designed to combat
discrimination and improve the status of women. By June 2003, 175 countries had ratified it. Yet, the CEDAW Committee, in charge of monitoring implementation, is composed of a very small staff, making it difficult to address multiple demands. 

There are signs, however, that in other areas important legal steps are being taken that show sensitivity to the idea of the world as a single community. Two such examples are the Trade Policy for America (approved by the U.S. Congress in 2007), which promotes sustainable development and concern for preservation of native plants and animals in the region, and the American Convention on Human Rights or the San Jose Pact, in effect since 1978, which sets regional standards for human rights.

Countering the optimism regarding the power of international NGOs and various specific legal initiatives, there is the concern that today we face a depoliticization of issues. Ong (2006) argues that the ideology of neoliberalism—which accompanies globalization today—has reframed many governing activities as “nonpolitical and nonideological problems that need [merely] technical solutions” (p. 3).

Challenges to the Attainment of Global Citizenship

It is clear that there is an immense disjuncture between the recognition of ideas and the actual practices regarding global citizenship. Citizenship has traditionally involved the connection between the individual and the state; global citizenship calls for new and difficult connections. A useful representation of the shifts from a national to a global mode of governance is proposed by Davies and Reid (2005), and presented in Table 2.

Davies and Reid’s conceptualization emphasizes issues of identity, interests, and the legal structures that each model of citizenship requires. Again, it must be argued that the ability to switch from a self-serving mode of interest to a kind of global solidarity must pass through a political process of accommodation and acceptance. Global citizenship requires a major eradication of injustice and inequality. The power base underlying the status quo would therefore be deeply questioned and thus opposed by those who benefit from present situations.

Further expanding the concept of global citizenship, Cogan (1997) finds that it would have to be multidimensional, and comprise the following eight characteristics: (1) the ability to look at and approach problems as a member of a global society; (2) the ability to work with others in a cooperative way and take responsibility for one’s roles and duties; (3) the ability to understand, accept and tolerate cultural differences; (4) the capacity to think in a critical and systemic way; (5) the willingness to resolve conflict in a nonviolent manner; (6) the willingness to change one’s style and consumption habits to protect the environment; (7) the ability to be sensitive toward and to defend human rights; and (8) the willingness and ability to participate in politics at local, national, and international levels. This is a tall order and it will require several generations to move into a new mind-set.

Although progress has taken place regarding human rights, it can be asked: Is the recognition of human rights sufficient for achieving a global citizenship? In what follows, I identify several barriers to the attainment of global citizenship:

(1) Can we have global citizenship before providing national citizenship?

It has been noted that citizenship grows out of community life and a common purpose—that people must respect each other’s rights
Table 2.

**Necessary Shifts from a National to a Post-National Model of Society and Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National governance</th>
<th>Global governance</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on narrow national interests</td>
<td>Global interdependence of countries and regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining a national identity</td>
<td>Fostering a global identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>National history</td>
<td>Extranational perspectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rights and obligations attached to individuals’ legal status in a country</td>
<td>Universal human rights (political, social, economic)</td>
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<td>National membership</td>
<td>Transnational identity</td>
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<td>National structures</td>
<td>Regional and global-level structures</td>
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Source: Adapted from Table 3, Davies & Reid, 2005, p. 75.

As well as fulfill their own responsibilities (Tam, 2001), that citizenship is rooted in a shared political culture and a common history. Globalization has challenged in many ways the existing definitions of national citizenship in highly industrialized countries. For many European countries and other industrialized nations, such as the U.S., Australia, and Canada, the promise of a better life has attracted a large number of immigrants. Given that new context, Held (1999) proposes a cosmopolitan democracy, in which people enjoy “multiple citizenships” and engage in a range of forms of politics, from local to global, conducted through complementary regional, national, and international assemblies. Similarly, Young (2000) asserts that the recognition of group difference is an essential condition for inclusive democratic rights.

With GATS (Article 19), the movement of professionals to and from member countries will become easier. This will facilitate the emergence of persons who live, work, and pay taxes in countries other than their own on a temporary basis and who might later decide to reside in the country in which they work and thus ask for full citizenship. This group of immigrants will not necessarily discard their previous identity; so it is possible that they will develop a de-facto double citizenship. For those who cannot come legally, illegal means have been and will continue to be utilized. Several industrialized countries rely on a large number of illegal aliens for menial, low-paying jobs. There is great variation in the treatment of migrants and refugees across nations (Carter, 2001). Typically, illegal aliens live marginalized existences and are not integrated into the society in which they now reside. In the case of undocumented second group of immigrants, officially estimated to number between 11 and 12 million people in the U.S. in 2007 (but more likely to be 20 million, national citizenship rights are reduced to a few civil prerogatives.

According to Bauder (2008), in many advanced nations citizenship today operates as a mechanism of distinction between migrants and non-migrants, making immigrant workers vulnerable to exploitative labor conditions and assigning them to the informal economy. While formal citizenship (a legal category) is open to immigrants, informal citizenship (practices of identity and belonging) are being constructed...
as mechanisms of exclusion based on notions of national origin, linguistic fluency (in the language of the recipient country), and "culture." These subtle mechanisms of "othering" create social as well as economic inequality, thus fostering internal distinctions that reproduce hierarchies among individuals and render difficult the concept even of a national citizenship.

(2) Can global citizenship flourish in a climate of individualism?

Citizenship implies distributive justice, and to attain it, people must show concern for one another. It has been observed that with globalization we have a "post-egalitarian society," which has been described as one that tolerates social marginalization, expulsion, and exclusion (Moos, cited in Arnot, 2006). A number of sociologists (Giddens, 1991; Beck et al., 1994; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Lash, 2002) assert that contemporary society brings individualization, a process described as the growing freedom of individuals from predetermined life courses, and their ability to create their own biographies by controlling their "own money, time, living space, and body" (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 32). Arnot (2006) links two opposing predictions to individualization. The first is that people have become interested mostly in themselves, that individuals see themselves as "consumers" rather than "citizens," and that they define governance as market efficiency, in which spaces for agency, negotiation, avoidance, opposition, and resistance are limited. The second prediction is that individuals are situating themselves outside traditional politics and thus gaining greater freedom to reflect and seek alliance with others, as shown by the growing instances of new social movements. It is still early to determine which prediction will prevail.

(3) Can global citizenship be accomplished in a context of unilateralism?

Sidhu (2007) reminds us that the concept of globalization itself is a collective of discourses—multiple ways of knowing—used toward convenient ends. At present, there is a strong revival of U.S. exceptionalism. Multilateralism has lost its force and its political-diplomatic tools have been debilitated (Salinas Figueredo, 2007). The presidential administration of G.W. Bush acted unilaterally in many ways, including on global environmental and security issues (e.g., its rejection of the Kyoto Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the International Criminal Court), legal principles, arms policies, and war decisions. This kind of exceptionalism goes together with a pejorative view of the "other." Such an attitude does not foster the emergence of global citizenship, which assumes a certain equality among human beings, embodied not only in the legal treatment countries receive but also in the respect they gain from other countries. The Bush Administration's view of the other was operationalized through a negative classification of countries: as we have seen, many are considered "failed states," "rogue states," or "fragile democracies"; a few are "consolidated democracies" and even fewer "democratic states." This classification is reminiscent of the classification of countries under colonialism, which divided them according to the level of advancement of their civilization (Sidhu, 2007), typically based on western standards. This distinction of countries and their self-interests also highlights the fact that national identity and national citizenship may counter the trend of global citizenship.

(4) Can global citizenship be attained in a context of capitalism?

Capitalism encourages creativity and innovation, but also the pursuit of
narrow individual interests, where economic competitiveness usually prevails over ethical considerations. Dahl, a noted scholar of democracy, considers that powerful tensions emerge between market capitalism and democracy, as the former creates inequalities in wealth, status, prestige, communication, and access to information (2007). With globalized capitalism we are seeing a concentration of technological progress in the economies of advanced countries in the North. Given the distribution of monetary and human resources, few developing countries can secure substantial industrialization advances (Sampaio, 2004).

An example of national self-interest is reflected in current efforts by post-communist countries to gain membership in the EU. In fact, such membership is their overriding concern, sought not solely for the objective of attaining democratic norms but also to participate in a larger and more powerful economy. If advanced capitalism enables TNCs to gain citizenship status, does this not create citizens with very different kinds of influence, responsibility, and accountability?

While economic and power asymmetries are growing, actions in favor of an increasingly unified world are also being advanced. Two sets of policies, Education for All (Dakar) and the Millennium Development Goals (both enacted in 2000), are generally considered expressions of serious global concern by industrialized countries. Civil society around the globe has mobilized around basic education, and groups such as Oxfam International, Action Aid, and the International Association of Teachers’ Unions are monitoring the various international initiatives. Comparing data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) from 1990 to 2002, it can be seen that more resources are being assigned to basic education, but the total amount given to the education sector today is proportionally smaller than in the 1990s, and the overall amount given by donor agencies for development purposes (both bilateral and multilateral) can accurately be described as stagnant.

(5) Can global citizenship flourish amid widespread global poverty?

The prevailing neoliberal theory of the global economy endorses the free market and the breaking down of national barriers, yet justifies a system that results in extremes of wealth and poverty (Carter, 2001; de Oliveira & Tandon, c1995). In this context, the universal membership implied by global citizenship is at risk.

It has been argued throughout this paper that the ideal type of citizenship relies on a democratic regime, the reason being its emphasis on egalitarianism. But rights are affected by problems of scarcity. Inequalities due to poverty, gender, and social class distinctions produce the exclusion of large numbers of individuals, a reality that goes against the notion of an “inclusive citizenship,” as the various attributes of inequality limit the exercise of agency by individuals and groups (Kabeer, 2002). To be actualized, rights require the direct redistribution of inherently scarce economic resources and the extensive use of resources for the organization of services such as medicine or education (Baubock, 1994). In other words, recognition of human rights alone is not sufficient to solve the practical problems of the poor (Ong, 2006); what is also required is the emergence of human capabilities, or concrete indicators of the quality of life (Nussbaum, 2006). Failure to eliminate poverty will not allow for a full citizenship; perhaps some civil and political rights may be shared, but not the crucial social rights needed for a decent life. Consequently, global citizenship may not emerge if poverty persists in its current forms and levels.
The elimination of poverty in developing countries is a complex undertaking calling for multiple measures. Two critical economic measures involve the principles of fair trade (e.g., elimination of agricultural subsidies in developed countries) and fair terms of trade. The elimination of poverty would also require direct and substantial state policies in the areas of health, education, housing, employment, and social security.

**Implications for Education**

In many social contexts, education must accomplish a double mission: present the facts regarding the contours and complexities of given problems, and promote a vision of a better reality. Updating civic education for the 21st century requires recognition of globalization in its many forms, and with its both positive and negative consequences. It also implies a consideration of the potential of global citizenship. How are we to prepare youth to understand the concept and to prepare for its unfolding realities? Can formal education fulfill this role? The discussion that follows centers on the U.S., one of the most mature democracies in the world, and thus a suitable referent for the examination of how civic education is treated in the schools. The U.S. is also a country with significant countervailing forces to the realization of a robust sense of global citizenship.

First, it must be recognized that school curricula are themselves the product of political agreements. As it has been aptly observed, the curriculum is “the collective story we tell our children about our past, our present, and our future” (Grumet, 1981, cited in Gough, 2000, p. 78). The curriculum tends to present the world devoid of conflict, and to portray one’s country in a righteous way—approximating what Plato called “noble lies.” Hence, there is a disjuncture between the world realities of power and formal expressions of citizenship in the classroom (Davis, 2007), on the one hand, and the way that “textbook authors have historically sought to create virtuous views of American history and culture” (Justice, 2007, p. 244). Under these conditions, some global citizenship discourses may be more acceptable than others because they imagine proactive positive action; such is likely the case with those related to world culture and the planetary vessel. The latter, however, may not be always adopted because it envisages a global governance structure—a de-centered kind of power still anathema to the U.S. political unconscious. Meanwhile, the self-interest manifested in the new-era realism and corporate citizenship discourses may not be deemed suitable for school-age minds.

Second, given the strong climate of economic competition and thus the predominance of science and technology in the curriculum, civic education is not a priority in U.S. schools today. A major report by the Carnegie Corporation and the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning (2003) found that, at present, civic education curricula in the U.S. are limited to one course on government, in contrast to wider curriculum coverage in the 1960s, which used to offer as many as three courses in civics, democracy, and government. Moreover, the current government course “describes and analyzes government in a more distant way, often with little explicit discussion of a citizen’s role” (p. 14). The report identifies three key reasons for the decline of civic education: first, the enormous concern with quality and efficiency in education has led to an unrelenting testing of students, and areas that are tested—math and reading—constitute the prevailing subject matter; second, the teachers fear criticism and litigation if they deal with topics considered “controversial or political in nature” (p. 15); and, third, there has been a decline, also since the 1960s, in school extracurricular activities such
as serving in a school organization, running for elective office in school, being a member of a speech or debate club, or being a member of a non-school youth organization—all experiences in which students can learn civic skills and attitudes and develop habits that promote participation. According to a 1998 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) Civic Assessment (cited in Carnegie Cooperation & CIRCLE, 2003), social studies classes are characterized by (a) memorization rather than active learning, and (b) exposure to material with limited diversity of values, opinions, and interests of citizens. White (2005) holds Several other observers that in general there is very little education that proposes transformational social visions in U.S. schools at present, as social studies have become secondary to math, language arts, and science education due to accountability measures dictated by the U.S. federal government since the 1990s.

The Carnegie & CIRCLE report does not make specific reference to global education but does recognize the need to “incorporate discussion of local, national, and global issues in the classroom” (p. 6). Contemporary U.S. students are more tolerant of others and favor free speech more than in the past; at the same time, they are less knowledgeable of principles of democracy and of public affairs than students in comparable countries (Carnegie Corporation & CIRCLE, 2003).

Third, the situation in the schools regarding civic education does not seem to have been touched by current globalization developments. In fact, it would appear that there has been little change over the past 25 years. A review of the literature by Cotton (1996), based on research conducted between 1982 and 1996, found strong consensus on the poor state of civic preparedness among students in the U.S. She found that civic education in school: lacked a focus on citizen rights, promoted passive learning, avoided controversial topics, did not train students in thinking and process skills, provided text-bound instruction, and lacked attention to global issues. In the state of California, the standards (the basis for the development of curriculum content) for history and social science examine issues related to citizenship mostly in grade 12, through “Principles of American Democracy and Economics.” The standards call for student understanding of “the changing role of international political borders and territorial sovereignty in a global economy” (California State Board of Education, 1997). They also call for an understanding of contemporary events such as the conflict in Bosnia, the Gulf War, and the War Powers Act. Beyond this, there is no reference to global citizenship.

Several curriculum proposals exist for global citizenship, among them two worth considering. The first is from Oxfam-GB, an international NGO devoted to social justice, including education. Oxfam’s (2006) proposal represents an extraordinary case of curriculum development for global citizenship, as it details age-specific knowledge for students of ages 5 to 19. Its curriculum separates knowledge and understanding, skills, and values and attitudes. Discourses treated under global citizenship are social justice and equity, diversity, globalization and interdependence, sustainable development, and peace and conflict. This curriculum seems quite complete and takes the students through increasing levels of understanding. For example, for students aged 14 to 16 it proposes to discuss causes of poverty and North/South power relationships and, for students aged 16 to 19, to instill consideration of lifestyles for a sustainable world, to develop a deeper understanding of different cultures and society, and to promote an understanding of the complexity of conflict issues and conflict resolution. The actual implementation of this
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curriculum, with relevant examples, accurate and complete treatment of issues, adequate supportive materials, and well-trained teachers, will ultimately determine its effectiveness.

The second proposal is offered by Joel Spring, a well-known observer of U.S. educational systems, who holds the view that a global citizenship core curriculum should address the students’ knowledge and skills that would include, among other things, knowledge about research on the causal factors influencing subjective well-being and its sustainability (Spring, 2007). Arguing that the emphasis on economic growth and consumption as measures of human development is subject to critique, he proposes a curriculum “designed to build national identity through teaching a common language and local citizenship, and to prepare citizens for participation in the local economy” (p.77). Note that Spring refers to an adjustment to the local, not global, economy—unlike most discourse today. Spring advises something quite unique in the design of a civic education curriculum: human happiness or a “subjective well-being” as the main objective in a global citizenship curriculum. To achieve this objective, he asserts that it will be paramount to instill in students an ethical responsibility and to use problem-solving methods as basic tools to change the world. The two curriculum proposals would introduce uncomfortable truths, questioning on the one side the discourses of the new-era realism and corporate citizenship while aiming at the attainment of planetary vessel.

So far, there has been little response by educational systems to either of these curriculum proposals. Both curricula have been produced very recently. It will be interesting to see whether these ideas are adopted, new ones created, or whether the civic education of many countries continues to focus on the nation-state.

Conclusions

In this paper, I have reviewed and classified differing conceptions of global citizenship based on four clusters of discourse and the social and material interests that drive them. In effect, these discourses provide alternative explanations for the widespread presence of the notion of global citizenship, and they show how to imagine a global citizenship that requires consideration both of individual level prerogatives and responsibilities and of power configurations at institutional and nation-state levels. Although it reflects human progress to aspire to a widely shared set of rights, entitlements, and responsibilities for all human beings, significant political and economic challenges at a scale higher than that of the individual remain to be resolved. As Habermas (1992) has noted, global citizenship implies the adoption of an ethical universalism in contrast to the maintenance of a politics and culture based on national particularism. Such a universalism would be a source of pride and self-confidence no longer based on domination of others. What emerge today as undeniable facts are more modest: an increasingly de-territorialized nature of citizenship, distinct types of collectivities, and multiple rules and governance at different levels.

Global citizenship implies a new world order; yet what shall it be? New identities—as a global citizenship would imply—require the acknowledgment of one’s self as well that of others in the national space and outside it (Sojo, 2002). It follows that a globalized citizenship has to be de-centered, acknowledging perspectives of the other (Mittelman, 2004). We live in a post-colonial world, and industrialized countries can no longer tell others how to live, even if the intentions are good. A global citizenship also implies a willingness to accept a dispersal of power.
It is my hope that the array of questions probed in this article has revealed the complexity that permeates the notion of global citizenship. Given the multiple and layered set of forces shaping key decisions at the global level, will we ever attain a comity of nations—one that includes global governance institutions and a global civil society? Is transnational governance perhaps destined to become a “dispersed, largely contingent form of governance that embraces connections, relations, and processes across different scales?” (Larner & Walters, cited in Sidhu, 2007, p. 207) Will we have a fragmented citizenship such as that represented in the EU, where rights, access, and a sense of belonging function at different territorial levels? And, given the dominance of capitalist ideologies, could a global citizen ever be one who does not subscribe to capitalism?

Citizenship is linked to universalism, as opposed to particularism, and yet the world is far from equal, and many “particularistic” forms of behavior prevail. This is especially reflected in the growing decision-making powers of central nations and the acquisition of citizen rights by transnational corporations. Further, expanded communications affect not only the speed at which messages are transmitted but also the way we are willing to be governed and thus the kind of global citizenship that is shaping up. We face today an increasingly persuasive set of experts in theorizing about knowledge, governance, and citizenship; and with the ease of communication and travel, these professionals play a significant role in the circulation of ideas. We face the presence of new ideologies, not just the exercise of coercion. Global citizenship thus emerges as a means to diffuse and install certain truths (Sidhu, 2007), while transforming in minor ways the functions of states and their exercise of power.

For those excluded from participating in the economic and political power structures that influence world affairs, global citizenship appears to be a very appealing notion, yet it is one that still potentially disguises growing inequalities and perhaps irreconcilable differences. Perhaps because the South needs tangible material benefits, the concept of global citizenship has attracted less attention in that region than issues of fair trade or restructured global institutions. But bottom-up activists do not lose hope of creating a more just social order. In their view, “global market mechanisms and structures of world governance can only be democratized through concerned global citizen action” (de Oliveira & Tandon, c1995, p. 8), a commitment that many grassroots groups are manifesting. Is there a role here for schooling and civic education? Formal education could play a role in the development of global citizens, but to do so, educators, especially in the North, would have to be less guided by positive national portrayal and more willing to undergo critique and reconstruction of cherished political ideas and ways of life. Their labor would be invaluable, for if a concept of global citizenship is to foster a better world, it needs to help people in the strongest countries to develop a sense of solidarity with rather than supremacy over others.
Endnotes

1 There is an extensive feminist literature on citizenship, demonstrating that the concept is deeply gendered as it assumes a free, autonomous individual, unfettered from domestic and care responsibilities. For the purpose of this paper, such a literature will not be invoked.

2 This school holds that states pursue their interests on the basis of their economic and military power or their security. Exemplars go from N. Machiavelli and O. von Bismark to H. Kissinger.

3 This idea of disqualifying incompetent nation-states is profoundly antidemocratic. It could be argued that, at the individual level, a basic principle in democratic practice is the right to vote. Such a right is not predicated on whether the person will vote “correctly” or not, nor does it establish other individuals as judges of one’s performance.

4 It remains to be seen whether President Barack Obama can change the current U.S. trajectory or its international policies, which depend on the political and economic environment ushered in by globalization.

5 Also promoting global citizenship are the universities in Northern countries, through their internationalization efforts that involve considerable study-abroad programs and their increasing adoption of features of TNCs, especially through the legal protection stipulated in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

6 While K-12 educational systems address citizenship and global citizenship through their civic education courses, at the university level this occurs less often. Given the highly diversified nature of courses, there are no unifying programs dealing with citizenship at higher levels of study, unless students major in such fields as political science, law, sociology, history, or international relations. For the purposes of this paper, civic education at the college level is not considered.

References


