Abstract

This review of 13 Latin American agrarian reforms shows that most have directly benefitted only men. It is argued that this is largely because of the common designation of “households” as the beneficiaries of an agrarian reform and the subsequent incorporation of only male household heads to the new agrarian reform structures. It is shown that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for rural women to be benefitted on a par with men is that they too can be designated as beneficiaries. Women as well as men must be given access to land or the opportunity to participate within the agrarian cooperatives or state farms promoted by an agrarian reform. This comparative analysis of the Latin American agrarian reform demonstrates that this has happened only in countries where the incorporation of rural women to the reform is an explicit objective of state policy.

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Rural Women and State Policy: The Latin American Agrarian Reform Experience

by

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RURAL WOMEN AND STATE POLICY: THE LATIN AMERICAN AGRARIAN REFORM EXPERIENCE

In Latin America agrarian reform has been the major state initiative in agricultural development and rural income redistribution over the last several decades. In some countries, agrarian reform fundamentally altered rural class structure and the national distribution of wealth and power. In other countries, efforts at reform were minimal, sometimes only involving colonization or resettlement schemes. Whatever the form or scale, each agrarian reform has involved state intervention in the redistribution of land to formerly landless or land-poor households.

The impact of an agrarian reform on rural women depends upon the class position of each woman's household, and whether that class, or segment of class, is a beneficiary of the reform. The broader the reform's redistributive thrust, the more women it should potentially benefit. It cannot, however, be assumed that the impact of an agrarian reform on rural households is gender neutral. An increase in the household's access to land or employment or in its level of income does not necessarily mean a positive change in women's socio-economic position. Processes of social change have complex economic, political, and ideological effects which may alter the social status of rural women as well as their position relative to men.

The central thesis of this paper is that most Latin American agrarian reforms have directly benefited only men. It is argued that this is largely because "households" are designated as the beneficiaries of an agrarian reform but only male household heads are incorporated into the new agrarian reform structures. It is shown here that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for rural women to be benefited on par with men is that they too be designated as beneficiaries. Women as well as men must be given access to land or the opportunity to participate in the agrarian cooperatives or state farms promoted by an agrarian reform. A comparative analysis of the Latin American agrarian reforms demonstrates that this has happened only in countries where the incorporation of rural women to the reform is an explicit objective of state policy.

This paper first presents a brief overview of thirteen Latin American agrarian reforms as well as the available gender-disaggregated data on agrarian reform beneficiaries. The following section presents an analysis of the mechanisms that have led to the exclusion of women among the beneficiaries of the agrarian reforms. It is argued that these mechanisms of exclusion are legal and structural as well as ideological. The two agrarian reform processes that have resulted in significant female participation--Cuban and Nicaraguan--are then examined. These cases illustrate how an explicit state policy favoring the incorporation of rural women is a necessary precondition for their participation. The next section considers why it is important, both for social equity and successful cooperative development, for women to be included as reform beneficiaries. The final section considers the barriers to women's effective participation as cooperative members.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AGRARIAN REFORMS

To establish the context for the subsequent analysis, this section presents a brief overview of the principal features of thirteen Latin American agrarian reforms. No attempt is made to analyze the efficacy of each of the agrarian reforms with respect to either its own goals or its actual impact upon the beneficiaries. Summarized in Table 1 is the year in which the agrarian reforms were initiated or subsequently modified, the most recent available estimate of beneficiaries as well as the proportion of rural households they represent, and the predominant form of tenure and productive organization in the reformed sector.

The potential redistributionary impact of an agrarian reform largely reflects the political project that the reform represents. The first three agrarian reforms carried out in Latin America, those of Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba, were the product of social revolutions. Through the agrarian reforms, the traditional hacienda was virtually eliminated and a major redistribution of landed property took place in favor of a significant proportion of the rural population.

These three reforms differ, however, with respect to forms of tenancy and the organization of production in the reformed sector. The thrust of the Mexican agrarian reform was to constitute the ejido, a form of communal based property with production carried out either collectively or individually. The Bolivian agrarian reform favored the creation of individual private holdings. While the Cuban agrarian reform also had a significant "land to the tiller" thrust (every tenant, sharecropper and squatter was given ownership of the land cultivated), the bulk of the expropriated land went to constitute state farms. Only in the mid-1970s was emphasis placed on the promotion of production cooperatives based on peasants pooling their individual holdings.

The agrarian reforms initiated in the 1960s represent the "Alliance for Progress" agrarian reforms. United States development assistance in the 1960s was contingent on the Latin American countries instituting agrarian reforms. United States policy clearly recognized that, if revolutionary social change was to be avoided in the Americas, the pressing issues of rural inequality and poverty had to be addressed.

Launched in the wake of the Cuban revolution, the Alliance for Progress agrarian reforms aimed both at containing the peasantry as a potential revolutionary force and at breaking the power of the Latin American landed elite. The traditional landowning class was viewed as an impediment to development and its hold on political power as a barrier to modernization. Moreover, it was argued, the redistribution of land would not only satisfy the peasantry's potentially revolutionary demands, but it would also spur growth by putting land into the hands of those who would work it most intensively. The higher incomes of these people would lead, in turn, to an enlargement of the internal market. A broader internal market would stimulate investment and hence the overall process of growth. Agrarian
reform was thus the ideal mechanism both to contain the peasantry and to establish the preconditions for successful capitalist development.

Nonetheless, agrarian reform efforts in many Latin American countries were minimal, although agrarian reform laws were on the books. Considered in this analysis are only those countries where relatively serious attempts at reform were made. Of the agrarian reforms initiated under the Alliance for Progress, only those in Peru, Chile, and Venezuela reached a significant number of beneficiaries. In the case of Peru and Chile, this only happened after the initial Alliance for Progress reforms were modified and implemented by more progressive governments, the Allende government in Chile (from 1970 to 1973) and the revolutionary military regime in Peru (from 1969 to 1978).

The Alliance for Progress agrarian reforms generally favored the creation of individual private property, as Table 1 shows. Often this was accompanied by the organization of credit and service or marketing cooperatives among individual producers. In the 1970s, a number of countries gave priority to the organization of production cooperatives (based on collective or group farming), such as the asentamientos in Honduras or the empresas comunitarias campesinas of Colombia. The Allende reform in Chile and that of the Peruvian military favored collective forms of production, although in the latter case some land was also distributed individually.

The agrarian reform initiatives of the eighties are the product of the revolutionary upheaval in Central America. The Nicaraguan and Salvadoran agrarian reforms represent quite different political projects. The Nicaraguan agrarian reform is being carried out in the context of revolutionary transformation, in the tradition of the first three Latin American agrarian reforms. Within the reformed sector, equal priority has been given to the constitution of state farms, production cooperatives, and individual producers grouped in credit and service cooperatives (Deere, Marchetti, and Reinhardt, 1984). In contrast, as a political project, the Salvadoran agrarian reform is being carried out in the legacy of the Alliance for Progress. Its primary intent is to contain the peasantry as a revolutionary force (Deere 1982a; 1984). The reformed sector includes both production cooperatives and a "land to the tiller" program.

All except the latter two agrarian reforms were initiated before feminism became an international force and women's participation in development, a development concern. Since 1973, the Percy Amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act has required all U.S. financed development programs to take into account their impact upon women. Moreover, since 1975 when the U.N. Decade for Women was launched, many Latin American countries have created governmental women's commissions or bureaus to oversee state policy with regard to women. To what extent have these efforts brought state policy to bear positively on the position of rural women within the context of Latin American agrarian reforms?
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries According To Gender

The majority of Latin American agrarian reforms have not produced significant numbers of female beneficiaries nor even given attention to gender as a beneficiary category. As Table 2 shows, few Latin American countries report beneficiary data by sex. Even after a decade of "women in development" efforts, the majority of countries still find it sufficient to publish beneficiary data according to the number of households or families benefited. For example, in the recent Salvadoran agrarian reform, potential beneficiaries applying for land under decree 207, (the Land to the Tiller program) are not asked their sex. The only country for which complete gender-disaggregated data on agrarian reform beneficiaries is available is Honduras. Data for Cuba and Nicaragua refer only to cooperative membership.

The available national-level data suggest that only in Cuba do women represent a significant number of current agrarian reform beneficiaries. Women constitute 26% of the 78,000 members of the country's 1,400 production cooperatives (Collins, Benjamin, and Scott 1984: chpt. XIII). The available data on the Cuban state farms also suggest that women have been incorporated as wage workers in significant numbers on the state farms. By 1968, 44,000 women were employed as permanent workers on the state farms, and in the mid-1970s women represented 53% of the permanent workers in the state tobacco industry, 41% in the dairy industry, 19% in food processing, and 7% in the sugar industry (FMC 1975: 19).

The 1982 Nicaraguan Cooperative Census revealed that 20% of the production cooperatives and 60% of the credit and service cooperatives (based on individual private holdings) have at least one woman member. However, in 1982 women represented only 6% of the total cooperative membership of 64,891. Rural women in Nicaragua fared somewhat better than their Honduran counterparts with women representing 3.8% of the agrarian reform beneficiaries.

A 1971 survey of 83 Peruvian agrarian reform cooperatives found that, of 724 members interviewed, approximately 5% were women (Buchler 1975). But as a national estimate, even this figure may be high because the survey excluded the important coastal agro-industrial sugar cooperatives where membership was almost exclusively male. Moreover, regional studies in northern Peru, in the cotton-producing zone of Piura (Fernandez 1982), and in the highland area of Cajamarca (Deere 1982b), found that women comprised only 2% of cooperative membership.

The available studies of the agrarian reform processes of other Latin American countries also suggest that the overwhelming majority of the agrarian reform beneficiaries have been men. Garrett reports that in Chile few women were beneficiaries of the agrarian reform (1982a, b). Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, the vast majority of beneficiaries have been men (Castro, Grullon, and Leon 1983: CEDEE 1983). In Colombia, women have been reported to be members of only 2 of 1,283 collective enterprises organized
between 1973 and 1982 (Caro 1982: 196). No mention of women's participation could be found in the literature on the remaining agrarian reforms surveyed.

MECHANISMS OF EXCLUSION

The participation of rural women in the agricultural labor force in Latin America--both in peasant units of production and as seasonal wage workers--has now been well documented in the literature. Yet, as the above data demonstrate, women have largely been excluded as agrarian reform beneficiaries. This section considers why and how women have been excluded from this major state initiative in rural areas.

The mechanisms of exclusion are legal, structural, and ideological. In most of the Latin American agrarian reforms, the legal criteria defining beneficiary status have served to exclude the majority of rural women. This is often compounded by the structural characteristics of women's labor force participation. Moreover, ideological norms regarding the "proper" sexual division of labor often impede women from joining cooperatives even when it is legally possible.

Underlying almost all of the Latin American agrarian reforms has been the assumption that the rural household is the primary social unit to be benefited from the reform. But for purposes of implementation, in all except Cuba and Nicaragua, only one member of the household, the household head, has been officially designated the beneficiary. Hence, only the head of household has received land in his/her name or the right of membership in production cooperatives or credit and service cooperatives in the reformed sector.

Restricting beneficiaries to household heads only discriminates against women since throughout Latin America social custom dictates that if both an adult man and an adult woman reside in a household, the man is considered its head. Yet, in the majority of agrarian reforms examined, the beneficiary criteria either required or gave strong preference to heads of households. Even in those cases where beneficiaries were defined as individuals it was usually assumed, if not explicit, that only one individual per household could be designated a beneficiary, and that was to be the household head. As a result, the only women who could potentially be reform beneficiaries were either widows or single mothers with no adult male living in the household.

A related, structural problem, is that many agrarian reforms have benefited only the permanent agricultural wage workers employed on estates at the moment of expropriation, excluding the often large seasonal labor force from cooperative membership. In both Peru and Chile, for example, the permanent agricultural wage workers on the expropriated estates were generally men, although women were often an important component of the seasonal labor force. Fernandez (1982) shows how on the northern Peruvian cotton plantations, although women represented up to 40% of the temporary labor force, few women held permanent jobs on the plantations, and as a result, women constituted only 2% of the cooperative membership.
For Chile, Garrett's (1976) analysis demonstrates how the process of modernization of Chilean agriculture over the course of the twentieth century resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of permanent workers in agriculture. But women were displaced disproportionately from the estate's labor force as these estates were mechanized. At the time of the agrarian reform, these estates had few permanent workers relative to the total labor force employed during the year, and the permanent workers were largely male. As a result, the beneficiaries of the reform were overwhelmingly men (Garrett 1982b).

The inability of these agrarian reforms to benefit the vast majority of seasonal agricultural workers was certainly prejudicial to both men and women. But whereas men were found in both categories of workers, permanent and seasonal, the structural characteristics of women's labor force participation resulted in women being excluded as a social group. The few women who were permanent workers on the estates, and thus potential beneficiaries of the reform, were then subject to the additional criteria of being household heads to become cooperative members. This, of course, reduced their participation still further.

Many of the reforms instituted in the Alliance for Progress period, besides prioritizing landless workers and tenants, selected potential beneficiaries on the basis of a point system. In the case of Colombia, for example, the point system favored those whose history of residence or work was in or near the farm being redistributed, and those peasants with more education, larger family size, good reputations and farming experience (Edwards 1980: 59). Women would certainly be at a disadvantage compared to men in terms of educational attainment. Moreover, female heads of household might also suffer under the reputation criterion if nonconformity with the patriarchal nuclear family norm lowered their status in the eyes of the community. Women would also be disadvantaged by the farming experience criteria if socially, men are considered to be the agriculturalists and women, as unremunerated family labor, simply the "helpers."

Ideological norms governing the proper sexual division of labor—that a woman's place is in the home while a man's is in the fields—appear not only in the content of agrarian reform legislation, but also constitute a significant barrier to the incorporation of women as beneficiaries in reforms that explicitly provide for the inclusion of female-headed households.

Inheritance provisions in the agrarian reform laws demonstrate that it was often explicitly assumed that beneficiaries would be male. Article 83 of the Venezuelan agrarian reform, for example, provides that in case of death or abandonment by the beneficiary: "the Institute will adjudicate the parcel to his wife or concubine, or in third place to the son..." (in Guerrero 1962). Similarly, the only mention of women in the Costa Rican agrarian reform law is the provision to give the land title, should the owner abandon the farm, "to the wife or the other person(s) who has lived permanently with the title owner" (Escota 1965: 12).
Only three agrarian reforms, those of Mexico, Bolivia and Honduras, made explicit provision to include female household heads as potential beneficiaries. The 1942 Mexican agrarian code provided for either single or widowed women to receive land in the ejido as long as they had dependent children. Nonetheless, the law also discriminated against women since men could apply for land irrespective of their family position if they were over 16 years of age or at any age if they were married. Single women without dependents and married women could not (Chavez de Velazquez 1960: 240). Moreover, if a female household head with land in the ejido married another ejido member she automatically lost her right to ejido land. While the apparent intention of this clause (article 171) was to prevent land concentration within the ejido, its consequence was to dispossess married women of land rights.

The revised 1971 Mexican agrarian reform law improved on the earlier agrarian code by stipulating that beneficiaries could be "male or female, above 16 years of age, or of any age if they have dependent children" (Anaya 1976: 75). Moreover, it allowed women with land rights to preserve them if they married another ejido member (Alcerraca 1974: 77). However, Article 200 requires beneficiaries to be agriculturalists and implicit in the law is that women are not. The assumption that women's primary responsibility is to the home and children is clear in the provision requiring ejidatarios to work the land directly. Only a female household head is exempted from this provision because of being "constrained by domestic work and the attention to small children who depend upon her" (Anaya 1976: 77).

The 1952 Bolivian agrarian reform law considered eligible for land "those older than 18 who have been exploited (under feudal relations of production)..., those older than 14 and married, and widows with dependent children" (Article 78, in Jemio 1973: 42). While the rights of widows were protected in this law, it is unclear whether single mothers could claim beneficiary status. And once again, married women appear to be precluded from acquiring land through the reform. However, the 1965 Law of Indigenous Communities did provide for "either men or women" to receive land in indigenous cooperatives (Urquidi 1971: 233). The few references to women in the literature suggest that few married women or even female household heads have availed themselves of this opportunity (McEwen 1969: 88; Iriarte 1980: 86).

The 1962 Honduran agrarian reform law, like the 1942 Mexican agrarian code, guaranteed the rights of both widows and single female household heads but discriminated against single women without dependents as compared to single men. In order to qualify as a beneficiary it was required to: "Be Honduran by birth, male, over 16 years of age if single or any age if married, or a single woman or widow if in charge of a family" (Article 68 in Escoto 1965: 46).

In terms of preference ordering, the Honduran law does give female household heads priority over male heads and single men, unless the men exploited land under indirect forms of tenancy, had been previously
dispossessed of their land, or had access to insufficient land as established by the zone (Ibid.: 47). Apparently, the overwhelming number of rural men fell into one of these categories for Youssef and LeBel (1981: 57) report that "in existing asentamientos women have last priority in being allocated land; they follow male-headed households, and single males." Yet, in 1974, 18.7% of Honduran rural households were headed by women (Callejas 1983).

An in-depth study of four Honduran asentamientos illustrated how the implementation of the law had resulted in the virtual exclusion of female household heads (Safilios-Rothschild 1983: 19). Women were simply not considered to be agriculturalists. While women's participation in certain agricultural tasks was recognized, women were not considered capable of carrying out the "heavier" agricultural tasks that required greater physical strength. Male cooperative members felt that women could join the cooperatives only if they had sons, and preferably adult sons, to replace them in agricultural field work. Thus, the predominant norms of the sexual division of labor served as a barrier to women's incorporation in the agrarian reform, although the law explicitly provided for at least female heads of household to be potential beneficiaries of the reform.

THE PRECONDITIONS FOR FEMALE PARTICIPATION

In only two countries, Cuba and Nicaragua, has neither sex nor kinship position been a legal barrier to the inclusion of women in the agrarian reform process. In both countries, not only female heads of household, but also wives and daughters, can qualify as agrarian reform cooperative members. Moreover, in both countries, the incorporation of rural women is an explicit state policy goal.

In terms of rural women's participation, the Cuban agrarian reform process began along a road similar to that just described. The numerically important small farm sector created through the first agrarian reform law (1959) was considered to benefit household units. The National Association of Small Producers (ANAP), the principal organization charged with developing credit and service cooperatives and other associations among private producers, was constituted by household heads who were primarily men. Within the state sector, the agricultural unions that were formed were also overwhelmingly male since they organized the permanent workers on the former sugar and cattle estates who were generally men. Although the number of permanent workers within the state sector was steadily increased, particularly after the 1963 agrarian reform law was promulgated, few women were employed on a permanent basis until the late 1960s.

The development of an explicit state policy with regard to the incorporation of rural women into the agrarian reform process was a response to both ideological and economic considerations. As the Cuban revolution began to develop its explicitly socialist character, the issue of equality, not just between social classes, but also between men and women, had to be addressed. Drawing on the Marxist classics, the Cubans accepted the
theoretical premise that women's equality with men required their incorporation of women into the social labor force (Engels 1975). The incorporation of women into productive labor was seen as a necessary step not only for women's own social development but also for the transformation of the social relations of Cuban society (Castro 1981; PCC 1976).

This theoretical position was complemented in the late 1960s by the economic imperative of increasing rural women's agricultural participation. The expansion of sugar cane production in the late 1960s significantly increased the demand for temporary labor. It was at this time that a concrete policy to integrate rural women into the labor force took form, and it was largely the result of the joint efforts of ANAP and the Cuban Women's Federation (FMC). In 1966, these two mass organizations joined to promote what were known as the FMC-ANAP brigades of rural women (FMC 1975). At first consisting of volunteer labor, they provided the mechanism for thousands of rural women to participate in social production for the first time (Bengelsdorf and Hageman 1977).

These female brigades were responsible for solving the seasonal labor shortages within the state sector and on private farms. It was estimated that by the mid-1970s women constituted over half of the seasonal labor force for the sugar cane, coffee, tobacco and fruit harvests (FMC 1975). An important change, which explains the steady increase in women's participation, was that by the mid-1970s brigade work was no longer unrenumerated. The FMC was successful in assuring that women were paid a wage for their work and that they received the same pay as men for equal work. Moreover, in order to encourage women's participation in the brigades, it was necessary to attend to women's reproductive roles. The FMC played a central role in promoting the development of child care centers in the countryside as well as the expansion of communal eating facilities at rural work centers.

The organization of rural women by FMC-ANAP was not limited to women's role in the seasonal labor reserve. It also promoted the incorporation of women as permanent workers on the state farms and as members of the credit and service cooperatives of private producers. In the 1970s, eligibility for cooperative membership was changed from household heads to individual membership for all adults in the farm household. The FMC-ANAP brigades became the channel for the provision of technical assistance specifically for women so that they could develop the general agronomic and veterinary knowledge required for modern farming as well as specific skills for their own income generating projects (FMC 1975). They also promoted women's participation in decision-making in the farm household and in the credit and service cooperatives.

The FMC-ANAP brigades proved an important mechanism for organizing rural women and, by taking into account their specific needs and interests as women, integrating them into the national project of revolutionary change. This is seen in terms of the role that rural women have played in the development of production cooperatives in the post-1975 period (FMC 1975). In that year, production cooperatives for the first time received official
endorsement; state incentives were given for private farmers to voluntarily collectivize their holdings. Among the incentives was the possibility of constructing a new agricultural community that allowed the socialization of many women's domestic tasks. Of equal importance was women's right of membership and guaranteed employment in the production cooperatives. As noted earlier, women now constitute 26% of the cooperative membership.

In contrast to the Cuban case, where women's participation in the agrarian reform evolved over the course of the revolution, the Nicaraguan agrarian reform included the incorporation of women among its objectives from the beginning. In the 1981 agrarian reform law, neither sex nor kinship position is a limitation on being an agrarian reform beneficiary. And the incorporation of women into the agricultural cooperatives is an explicit objective detailed in the 1981 Agricultural Cooperative Law (Chpt. II, Article 2). Moreover, the legislation requires women to be integrated into the cooperatives under the same conditions as men, with the same rights and duties. The agrarian legislation conforms to the Statute of Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans (Decree No. 52, 1979, Article 3) which establishes the equality of the sexes before the law and requires the state "to remove by all means all obstacles that impede the equality of its citizens and their participation in the political, economic and social life of the country."

Interestingly, in a recent study of women's participation in the Nicaraguan agrarian reform cooperatives it was found that many women did not await the passage of the agrarian reform legislation to begin joining the agricultural cooperatives (CIERA 1984: chpt. 3). In the majority of cases studied, women joined the cooperatives as they were being constituted in the 1979-1981 period. This reflects the important participation of women in Nicaragua in the struggle that defeated the Somoza dictatorship; women felt that they "had won their right" to participate in the cooperative movement. Nonetheless, the study also showed that the law has been an important armament in breaking down traditional views of the proper sexual division of labor and male resistance to female participation in the cooperatives.

Even in a revolutionary setting, cooperatives are still organized without taking the possible participation of women into account. In interviews with all-male cooperatives, members often asserted that women were not interested in cooperatives because they did not perform agricultural work. In fact, in several cases women had demonstrated their interest in joining these cooperatives but the male members had ignored them (Deere 1983; CIERA 1984). As is the case in Honduras (Safilios-Rothschild 1983), male cooperative members were often reluctant to admit women as members since they did not believe that women could carry out a sufficient number of agricultural tasks. Nonetheless, case studies of ten cooperatives with women members revealed that women participated in productive activities on par with the men. Moreover, men in cooperatives with women members were much more positive about women's participation and contribution than men in cooperatives without women members. This has also been reported in Honduras (Safilios-Rothschild 1983). It suggests that a positive state policy with
regard to women creates the necessary preconditions for women's participation and that giving women a chance to participate has important effects on ideological norms regarding the gender division of labor. This, as will be discussed later, has important implications for successful cooperative development.

The importance of a clear and vigorous state policy with respect to women's participation is illustrated by a contrasting example to the Cuban and Nicaraguan cases, that of the Chilean agrarian reform. Upon taking office in 1970, the Allende government broadened the criteria for defining beneficiaries because redistribution of access to resources as well as the generation of increased employment opportunities in the countryside were explicit policy goals of the Popular Unity government. The imbalance between the situation of permanent and temporary workers on the asentamientos (who were respectively, the members and non-members) was seen to be particularly problematic, so the asentamientos were reorganized to facilitate the incorporation of temporary workers.

In this broadening of the potential beneficiaries of the reform, the legal-structural impediments to women's participation within the new agrarian reform structures were eliminated (Garrett 1982a,b). Neither sex nor marital status were to constitute criteria for membership, and all individuals over 18 years of age were eligible to become members of the general assembly of the new Centers of Agrarian Reform (the CERA's). As Garrett shows, the conditions were in place for women to be able to participate in the agrarian reform, but the new regulations did not result in the incorporation of a significant number of rural women. This was partly because of the lack of clarity within the Popular Unity government as to what should be the role of women in the agrarian reform.

Garrett's analysis shows how ideological and political factors worked against women's incorporation into the reformed sector even after their participation was made legally possible. She argues that women's participation in the CERA's was resisted by both men and women. This reflected the conservative influence of what was the strongest women's organization in the countryside, the Centros de Madres (mother's centers) organized by the Christian Democratic party under the Frei administration. The centers focused on and promoted women's domestic role much as they did in the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Venezuela. They gave little attention to women's role in production or to social problems since these were considered inappropriate activities for women. But they did provide rural women with a social outlet that drew them out of their homes into a forum where they could discuss their own everyday problems. At their heyday, the centers had some 10,500 members in the Chilean countryside.

The centers were apparently never integrated into the structure of the asentamientos. The Popular Unity government recognized this as a problem and proposed to organize rural women into Social Welfare Committees linked to each CERA. The Social Welfare Committees were intended to find collective solutions to social problems. But as Garrett illustrates,
neither men nor women were in agreement that women should be concerned with problems that went beyond their own domestic units. Few rural women joined the Social Welfare Committees of their own volition, and the Allende government neither had nor directed the human resources required to organize rural women along lines different from those that had been traditionally successful. This was partly because of the difficult political conjuncture with which the Allende government was faced by 1973, but it also reflects the lack of a clear state policy with regard to the incorporation of women. In other words, the explicit absence of a state policy vis-a-vis women's participation in the agrarian reform was a source of confusion and acted as a barrier to women's actual incorporation.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF INCORPORATING WOMEN**

It is important for women as well as men to be included among the direct beneficiaries of an agrarian reform to ensure both social equity grounds and the success of cooperative development. The exclusion of women not only has high costs for women, in that their position can be harmed both relative to men's and absolutely, it also has costs for cooperative and rural development programs. And if the goal of an agrarian reform is to foster a process of social transformation, as was considered the case in various of these reforms, then the exclusion of one social group on the basis of gender or family position certainly limits the breadth and depth of the reform process.

Social equity criteria would require that, at the very least, if both men and women are permanent agricultural workers, both be entitled to become beneficiaries of an agrarian reform. An example from the dairy region of northern Peru, the province of Cajamarca, is illustrative of the discriminatory nature of constituting production cooperatives on the basis of only those permanent workers who are household heads (Deere 1977). In this region, women made up from 30% to 50% of the permanent workers on the dairy farms since milking (which is still done manually) was considered a strictly female task. But of the 15 agrarian reform production cooperatives in the province, only five had female members and, overall, women constituted only 2% of the total cooperative membership. The women workers were excluded from cooperative membership primarily because they did not qualify as household heads because of their kin relationship to a male permanent worker on the farm. The result was that the only women who became cooperative members were widows or separated women who did not live with an adult man and who had children under 18 years of age.

If a goal of state policy in creating production cooperatives is to allow the participation of workers in the decisions concerning their labor process and in the allocation of the surplus which they produce, the exclusion of one group from membership on the basis of sex and kinship, is, at best, discriminatory. At worst, it creates the conditions internal to the cooperative for the exploitation of one social group by another.

This is also the case in the relationship between permanent workers (the cooperative members) and temporary workers. In the Peruvian reform process,
few temporary workers were incorporated into the cooperatives; they were not covered by social benefits, and their wages were usually lower than those of the cooperative members. Fernandez (1982) and Chambeu (1981) report that, in the cooperatives in Piura and Cuzco that they studied, not only were the majority of women working on the cooperatives temporary workers, but the women earned wages lower than did the male temporary workers. Moreover, women's wages relative to both male temporary workers and the cooperative members declined over the reform period. In the case of the Piura cotton cooperatives, work opportunities for women also declined over the reform period (Fernandez 1982). Since the women had been excluded from cooperative membership, they had no recourse in this deterioration in their economic position.

The only reference to women's participation in the Ecuadorian agrarian reform is Article 8 of the 1973 Statutes of Production Cooperatives. The Statutes list as a condition for the official recognition of the cooperative that a cooperative employ outside labor only "occasionally...and then only when preference has been given to the wives and families of members" (In Redclift 1978: 154). The analysis of the fate of female temporary workers in Peru suggests how marginal this institutional recognition is to women's labor force participation.

Another way in which processes of agrarian reform may be harmful to women is in terms of the changes introduced in traditional patterns of land rights. In most Andean highland areas, land inheritance has been bilateral. Women's ownership of land has assured them of participation in both agricultural decision-making and the allocation of household income. Land ownership has also given women a modicum of material security because they have not been totally dependent on their spouses. If a woman was abandoned or separated from her spouse, her inheritance assured her of a means of maintaining her family as single women.8 Not surprisingly, a woman's status within the household and community is closely related to her ownership of land.

The Peruvian agrarian reform process represented a real setback for rural women. While the objective of the reform had been to promote production cooperatives on the estates that were expropriated, in many cases this was impossible due to peasant resistance and, in the post-reform period following the election of Belaunde, these peasants received individual titles to their plots. But since only male household heads were designated the potential beneficiaries, the land titles issued by the reform agency generally have been given only to men.

It cannot be assumed that indirect participation in a reform process (through the head of household) is the equivalent of direct participation. The organization of credit and service cooperatives among independent producers on the basis of only male household heads may have important consequences for women's agricultural productivity. Providing technical assistance only to men will not necessarily result in women gaining access to the information or guarantee that they will take it into account and
put it into practice. For example, if women are traditionally charged with seed selection in the peasant household, it cannot be assumed that training men in the benefits of new varieties will result in the information being passed on to and accepted by the women.

A Nicaragua cooperative study found an impressive disparity in the level of technological knowledge of women members and women non-members (CIERA 1984: Chpt. 5). Male cooperative members rarely shared with their non-member wives what they were learning. On one credit and service cooperative with a significant number of female members, one male member admitted to this author that he was worried that his non-member wife knew so little compared to the female members because, if anything happened to him, she would take over management of the farm. But this reflection only took place because women had already been incorporated as cooperative members.

The 1979-83 Honduran National development plan appears laudatory in that it calls for the incorporation of 5,625 peasant women who are "direct or indirect" beneficiaries of the reform in activities leading to the economic diversification of the cooperatives (Honduras n.d.). But incorporating women as temporary wage workers or into special income generating projects does not necessarily lead to an improvement in their material well being or status. Without the status of cooperative membership, the women are assured neither control of the resources necessary to carry out complementary income generating activities (Garrett 1982b) nor participation in the decisions governing labor allocation, wages, or the surplus produced.

The 1971 Mexican law is also unusual in providing women who are non-ejido members access to one parcel of land for collective agro-industrial activities. Article 103 indicates that the land should be of the best quality and adjacent to the urbanized area with "child care centers, centers of sewing and education, nixtamal mills, and in general, all those installations destined specifically to be at the service and protection of the peasant woman" (Anaya 1976: 79). Whether these actually materialized is unknown. While it is commendable that the law gives some attention to women, it must be kept in mind that these rights are not the equivalent of having access to land in one's own name or the right to participate in the decisions of the ejido.

Moreover, all too often these special projects aimed at women fail to recognize women's role as agricultural producer and serve to reproduce the idealized sexual division of labor with women as housewives and mothers. This has been the case not only in Honduras and Mexico, but also in Chile, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. Since the 1960s in all of these countries, the wives of beneficiaries have been organized into "mother's clubs" or "mother's centers" where they are taught skills that are an extension of their domestic roles: cooking; sewing; flower arrangement; etc. (Callejas 1983; Garrett 1982a,b; Soto 1978; CEDEE 1983; Castro et al. 1983).
When an agrarian reform directs state efforts and resources to benefit one group of the population through access to land, credit, technical assistance, marketing channels, etc., it is concentrating resources on only one specific group with socio-economic consequences for those who are excluded. It cannot be assumed that, by benefiting the male head of household, all household members will be benefited as well. Neither can it be assumed that, by organizing women into their own gender-specific activities, women will not lose out relative to men. The household is not gender neutral and neither are the effects of a process of state intervention.

Women as a Positive Force for Cooperative Development

The Nicaraguan experience thus far seems to show that the incorporation of women to the agrarian cooperatives has been beneficial for cooperative development. In the cooperatives with women members, women are considered to be excellent agricultural workers, and they are a force of cohesion and stability in the cooperatives. In one study, it was found, for example, that proportionately more men than women had left the production cooperatives for reasons of personal feuds with other cooperative members or because they did not like collective work. The relatively few women who had abandoned the cooperatives were more likely to have left because of family problems such as jealous husbands (Deere 1983).

In the few cooperative enterprises with women members in Colombia, women have also been noted to be a force of stability and cohesion. Lodono (1975: 144) reports that "the integration of the woman and family has proven itself of real influence in the cohesiveness of the empresa. When the family lives on empresa land, when the woman participates in the assemblies and in the committees, with voice and even with vote, when she is listened to on problems of management and administration, the whole group feels itself more rooted in the empresa."

In Nicaragua, as in Cuba, women appear to be a favorable force behind collectivization. In Nicaragua, the strong commitment of the women members of the production cooperatives to collective work is in many ways explained by the history of discrimination against women in rural Nicaragua. The majority of women members were previously landless wage workers and, as women, they had fewer agricultural employment opportunities open to them than did the men. Moreover, in the past, women were always paid less than men, even for the same tasks. Today they earn the same wage as men irrespective of the task performed, and the cooperatives offer them security of employment for the first time (Ibid.).

The discrimination women have traditionally faced also explains why women seem less prone than men to dream of their own private plots, and why, in some cases, women have voluntarily pooled their private land parcels to form a production cooperative. Because women had not been taken seriously as agricultural producers in the past, they had been excluded from access to credit and technical assistance. Moreover, female household heads often
found it more difficult than men to acquire sufficient labor for certain agricultural tasks and to acquire male labor for the key "male only" tasks. Pooling their land offers them the security of permanent employment and income.

In the Cuban case, female support for collectivization seems to be particularly tied to the advantages offered women in the realm of reproduction. Up through the 1970s, Cuban policy greatly favored workers on state farms through the development of what are known as the agricultural communities. The new communities offer modern housing, guaranteeing the provision of potable water, sanitation and electricity; moreover, they offer health centers, schools and day care centers, communal eating facilities, and stores provisioned with basic necessities. The principal change in policy with respect to the formation of production cooperatives was that, for the first time, the facilities for the construction of similar agricultural communities would be offered to farmers that pooled their land to form such a cooperative. The state would provide the materials and technical assistance if the new cooperative members provided the labor.

The rural women interviewed by this author in 1981 were quite clear as to the benefits offered them by the new agricultural communities. What they all stressed was the increase in their families' standard of living and well being and the importance of having convenient child care. Moreover, the improved housing greatly reduced the drudgery of housework. It was quite clear that women's enthusiasm for the new agricultural communities had been a central factor in the successful development of the production cooperatives and that this enthusiasm was tied to the benefits offered women with respect to their responsibility for household reproduction.

Both the Nicaraguan and Cuban experiences demonstrate that social equity and successful cooperative development are not a trade-off. Moreover, these positive experiences suggest the costs of excluding women in the other Latin American agrarian reforms.

THE PROBLEM OF ASSURING WOMEN'S EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION AS COOPERATIVE MEMBERS.

The analysis of women's participation in the Latin American agrarian reforms has demonstrated the importance of an explicit state policy with regard to the inclusion of women as reform beneficiaries. Legal reforms, however, only clear the way for women to claim beneficiary status. They are a necessary but not a sufficient condition to ensure women's effective participation within the reformed sector. In this section, the difficulties that rural women have experienced in exercising their full rights of membership in the cooperatives are examined. It is argued that, for women to achieve full equality with men as cooperative members, state attention must also be given to the material and ideological aspects of women's subordination.
A fairly common observation among those who have studied agrarian cooperatives with women members in Latin America is that, while women may participate in the productive activities of the cooperatives on par with men, they play a much reduced role with respect to cooperative decision-making. In the Peruvian cooperatives, female members usually attended cooperative meetings, but rarely did they actually participate in the discussions (Deere 1977; Fernandez 1982; Chambeu 1981).

Buchler (1975: 50) describes Peruvian women's participation as follows: "At the cooperative meeting the woman member is expected to be more reserved than the men. She usually sits on the floor in peasant society while the men take up any of the chairs available. Nevertheless, she can speak up when her interests are endangered. Her opinion will be listened to, but she seldom has much effect unless seconded by some important male leader."

Fernandez (1982) reports that, in northern Peru, women as well as men viewed women's lack of education as a central factor in their inability to participate as effective cooperative members. In rural Peru, illiteracy falls disproportionately upon women. The men reportedly viewed this as the principal reason women were unqualified to participate in decisions regarding the cooperative. The women viewed their illiteracy as the primary reason that men showed little respect for their views and they were afraid to speak at cooperative meetings. But it should also be noted that women constitute a minority of the membership of these cooperatives, and the sheer power of numbers might explain the women's reluctance to participate in the meetings.

In the Nicaraguan cooperatives, the women members were also less likely than the men to offer their opinions in cooperative meetings and to be actively involved in the affairs of the cooperative (CIERA 1984). The relatively lower degree of education of the women as compared to the men was often cited as the reason for women's lesser participation in cooperative decision-making. While the majority of women members in Nicaragua are literate (most as a result of the 1980 literacy campaign), few have confidence in their ability to deal with the complex affairs of cooperative management. Moreover, household responsibilities often limit their ability to participate in the on-going adult education program, thereby reproducing the inequality in functional literacy levels.

The responsibility of women for domestic chores and child care limits their ability to participate as effective cooperative members in other ways. The working day of women members is much longer than that of their male counterparts. The women members commonly spend two to three hours in domestic labor before going out to the fields and, after a six to eight hour day working for the cooperative, return home to resume their domestic tasks. In contrast, the men usually socialize with the other male cooperative members after work, time often spent discussing cooperative business (CIERA 1984).
The problem of "the double day" also affects the ability of women to meet their full membership responsibilities in the cooperatives. It also explains, in the Peruvian case, the poor retention rate of women members. Chambeu (1981) reports that in a Cuzco cooperative that she studied, the male members felt that women were not serious about their commitment to the cooperative since they often could not work a full day because of family problems. If the children are sick, it is usually women who must leave work to care for them. Rather than viewing this as a social problem, the response in this cooperative in 1980 was to vote not to accept any more women as members. The cooperative had already lowered women's wages with respect to men's, contrary to Peruvian minimum wage provisions. With these impediments to participation, it is not surprising that half of the original eight women members resigned, being replaced by their husbands. 9

Biological reproduction is another factor that sometimes places women cooperative members at a disadvantage. In few countries have cooperatives made provisions for paid maternity leave. Only in Cuba are women cooperative members covered by a national social security system that includes paid maternity leave among its benefits. In the Peruvian case, cooperative members were covered by the labor legislation that stipulated a woman worker's right to paid maternity leave, but the costs fell on the individual cooperative. The male cooperative leadership considered it unjust for the cooperative to bear such a cost. On one cooperative, in Cajamarca, a woman who had demanded her legal right to paid maternity leave was pressured to resign. She was subsequently replaced in the cooperative by her husband.

The responsibility of women for domestic labor and child care, as well as their relatively lower educational attainment and lack of authority over men, are among the principal reasons cited for women's not being elected to leadership positions in the cooperatives. In Peru, only a handful of cases have been reported of cooperatives with women officers (Bronstein 1982). Chambeu (1981) reports the negative and short-lived experience of a Cuzco cooperative that elected a woman to a leadership position. Because of family responsibilities, the woman was unable to effectively carry out the work that she had been assigned, confirming the view of the majority of men that women are not suited for leadership positions. This experience suggests that women's responsibilities in the household do constitute a barrier to their effective participation within cooperatives. This problem must be directly addressed.

In Nicaragua, the data on women in cooperative leadership positions is more encouraging. A study of ten cooperatives with women members found that a woman was a cooperative officer in half of them (CIERA 1984). In most cases a woman had been elected to a leadership position as a result of an explicit consensus in the cooperative that the women members should have a representative. This itself was the product of the explicit state policy, actively promoted by the peasant's organization, to assure women's full participation within the cooperatives.
While gender-disaggregated data on cooperative leadership is not available for Cuba, the data on women in leadership positions in the peasant organization responsible for organizing the production cooperatives is quite favorable. In the mid-1970s, 16% of the local leadership positions in ANAP were held by women (PCC 1976: 30).

Of all the Latin American agrarian reforms, the Cuban agrarian reform process is the one in which women have made the most impressive gains. But even these women still do not participate in production on equal terms with men (Croll 1979). Women are still disproportionately represented among the temporary workers who provide seasonal labor to the state farms and to the production cooperatives. Collins, Benjamin, and Scott (1984) also report that women's earnings on the cooperatives are substantially lower than men's. They note that there is still a marked sexual division of labor in productive tasks, and men's tasks are often better paid. Further, women cooperative members often work fewer days and fewer hours per day than men because of household responsibilities.

Cuban state policy has recognized the burden of the double day for women and its role in limiting women's full participation in production. The Family Law, promulgated in 1975, requires men to share equally in child rearing and in domestic maintenance tasks when the wife works in social production (see Stone 1981: Appendix 2).

This is a most innovative step in social policy. Its importance lies in state recognition of the fact that women's participation in social production alone is not enough to guarantee women's equality with men as long as women alone carry the burden for reproduction. If domestic labor cannot be fully socialized, the only alternative, if women's equality is to be achieved, is for men to share the reproductive burden. While Cuban society has not yet eradicated the subordination of women, important legal and economic preconditions, necessary to achieve the goal of social equality, are in place.

CONCLUSIONS

This comparative analysis of the Latin American agrarian reform experience has demonstrated that processes of socio-economic change are not gender neutral. It cannot be assumed that state policies designed to benefit rural households will necessarily benefit the women in them.

Rural women in Latin America have not benefited from agrarian reform on par with men. Lack of attention to the incorporation of women as direct beneficiaries has resulted in women losing access to resources and/or being displaced from productive activities. The consequences are both economic—leading to lower female productivity or lower incomes—and social—contributing to a decline in female status and well being. The lack of inclusion of women in new agrarian reform structures has also created new barriers to achieving male-female equality, barriers that serve to reproduce
women's subordination. Moreover, the lack of female participation has also lead to less successful processes of cooperative development, agrarian reform, and certainly of social transformation.

This comparative analysis of agrarian reform processes suggests that how rural women fare in an agrarian reform is closely tied to state policy. The inclusion of women in a process of social-economic change does not happen automatically. At a minimum, it requires state attention to the legal and structural barriers that preclude female participation. As demonstrated, the criteria for selection of agrarian reform beneficiaries is most important in this regard. A crucial pre-condition for an egalitarian agrarian reform is that all adults in the targeted group be legally entitled to be beneficiaries.  

The right to acquire land in one's own name or the right of cooperative membership is a necessary but not sufficient condition for women to participate on par with men in an agrarian reform. State policy must also be directed towards creating the incentive and support structure for women to want to participate, to be able to overcome the possible resistance of men, and to be able to participate effectively. Attention to women's domestic responsibilities and making these compatible with productive work are important components of both the incentive and support structure. Other policies that enable women to participate more effectively in the new agrarian structures include adult literacy programs and agricultural and leadership training courses specifically for women.

This comparative analysis of the Latin American agrarian reforms also suggests the important role that rural organizations can play in either promoting or discouraging women's participation in the new agrarian structures. The Cuban experience is most instructive, for here the mass organizations provided the crucial mechanism to link macro-policy with local level processes of change. Moreover, the coordination between the women's organization and the small farmers' organization proved effective in integrating women to the overall process of agrarian reform while paying attention to the specific needs of women.
NOTES

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Conference on "After The Second Sex: New Directions," University of Pennsylvania, April, 1984. The author is grateful to Hannah Roditi for skillful research assistance.

2. An excellent class-analytic overview of the Latin American agrarian reforms is provided in de Janvry (1983: chpt. 6).

3. The short-lived Guatemalan agrarian reform also fits into this category. Between 1952-54, 33% of the peasantry was benefited through the reform (de Janvry 1983: Table 6.1); the reform was subsequently undone.

4. After the implementation of the Cuban 1963 agrarian reform law, 63% of the cultivable land was in the state farm sector and 37% within the private, small farm sector (MacEwan 1981: chpts. 6, 8).

5. See Beneficiary Application Form, Appendix 3 in Simon, Stephens, and Diskin (1982). The Agency for International Development, currently funding this agrarian reform, informed the author that data according to the sex of beneficiaries was not available for either Phase I or Phase III of the reform. Nevertheless, compliance with the Percy Amendment requires that all U.S. foreign assistance programs take into account the impact of such programs on women.

6. In both the Cuban and Nicaraguan reforms, land has been distributed in the form of individual private holdings to peasant households who have not necessarily joined cooperatives. Moreover, also excluded from this estimate are female permanent workers on the state farms. As a result, the available data underestimate the proportion of women benefited through the reform.

7. See Leon (1982) for a compilation of recent writings on women's agricultural participation throughout Latin America. A measure of women's agricultural participation in the Andean region is provided in Deere and Leon de Leal (1982).

8. Data for the Peruvian province of Cajamarca illustrate the importance that women have placed on owning land. In this area, many of the large estates were sub-divided by the landlord class in the 1950s and 1960s and the core of the estates converted into modern dairy enterprises (Deere 1977). Peasant households were given the opportunity to purchase the more marginal hacienda lands. Through an analysis of the property registers of the province, I found that 40% of these land sales to the peasantry were registered in the name of both husband and wife. In the remaining 60%, land was registered in the name of only one person, but just as many women as men purchased land in their own names.
9. Structural problems, related to beneficiary criteria, are also important in explaining why the few women cooperative members in Peru have gradually been displaced. In one of the Peruvian dairy cooperatives studied by this author, the majority of women members in 1976 had been young single women who subsequently married in the 1976-1982 period. Since, according to cooperative laws, only the head of household could be a member of the cooperative, as these young women married they ceded their positions to their husbands. This was also the only way that their husband could obtain full time employment in the countryside. Chambeu (1981) reports a similar phenomenon in the Cuzco region.

10. A few Latin American countries have recently begun to take into account women's role as agricultural producer in designing agricultural sector strategies. For example, in Colombia, a recent policy document recognized the importance of removing barriers with respect to women's access to land; moreover, it recommended that state agricultural resources be directed specifically to rural women (Colombia 1984).
Table 1. The Latin American Agrarian Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>BENEFICIARIES</th>
<th>% RURAL HOUSEHOLDS</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1917, 1971</td>
<td>2,890,000</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>ejidos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>217,000</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1959, 1963</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>state, indiv., &amp; prod. coops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>107,523</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>individual &amp; prod. coops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1961, 1973</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>individual &amp; prod. coops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>18,078</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1962, 1975</td>
<td>33,203</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>individual &amp; prod. coops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>individual &amp; some coops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1962, 1970</td>
<td>58,170</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>asentamientos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1963, 1969</td>
<td>359,600</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>prod. coops &amp; some individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1964, 1973</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>individual &amp; some coops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1979, 1981</td>
<td>72,072</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>state, prod. coops., &amp; individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>74,936</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>prod. coops. &amp; individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SOURCES AND NOTES TO TABLE 1:

Mexico: Manzani (1977); percent of rural households benefited based on estimated 4,210,877 rural households in 1971.

Bolivia: Jemio (1973: 43, 73-74); based on estimated 668,597 rural households in 1970. In 1970, there were 587 production and marketing cooperatives in existence with 25,009 members.

Cuba: Based on estimate of 110,000 new property owners as result of 1959 and 1963 laws, and permanent employment on state farms of 150,000 by 1963 (MacEwan, 1981: 53, 56). Mesa-Lago (1972: 49) reports a somewhat higher figure, 200,000 new property owners, by the end of the implementation of the 1963 agrarian reform. In 1983 there were 1,400 production cooperatives with 78,000 members (Collins, Benjamin, and Scott, 1984).

Venezuela: Soto (1978: 80); based on estimated 625,144 rural households in 1970. The figures on the number of beneficiaries appear to be highly disputed; other sources put it closer to 95,000. In 1968 there were 210 production cooperatives with 78,000 members.

Colombia: Blutstein (1977: 354); based on estimated 1,305,582 rural households in 1975. The beneficiaries includes the de facto recognition of squatters. Anaya (1976) reports a much lower figure for 1970, 12,570 beneficiaries, amounting to only 1.1% of rural households. In 1982, there were 1,284 empresas comunales with 12,300 households (Caro, 1982: 196).

Costa Rica: Barahona (1980: 275); based on estimated 214,516 rural households in 1975. Seligson (1980: 152) reports a much lower figure, 11,306 beneficiary families in 1976, representing only 5.3% of rural households in that year. In 1977, 17 production cooperatives were reported in existence with 517 members.

Honduras: Callejas (1983); Honduras (n.d.; 7); based on 428,516 rural households. In 1976, 133 empresas asociativas were reported, with 10,000 members.

Dominican Republic: Weil (1973: 182); based on estimated 446,835 rural households.

Chile: Cifuentes (1975); based on estimated 290,850 rural households.

Peru: Caballero and Alvarez (1980). The number of beneficiaries is a bit deceptive for over one-third of the beneficiaries enumerated in this estimate consist of households in the officially recognized peasant communities whose communities were adjudicated access to grazing land. Estimate based on 971,892 rural households in 1975.

Ecuador: Franco-Garcia (1976: 49); based on estimated 716,447 rural households. Blankstein and Zuvekas (1973: 81) report that 88% of huasipungo households (engaged in feudal relations of production on large estates) became landowners through the reform.
Nicaragua: The estimate includes 22,072 individuals that have received land either as individual holdings or as part of a production cooperative as of December, 1983, under the 1981 agrarian reform law, as well as 50,000 permanent workers on the state farms (Deere, Marchetti & Reinhardt, 1984). The figure underestimates the total number of beneficiaries since it does not include those who have gained access to land through the reform but who have not yet received land titles. In 1983, there were an estimated 238,602 rural households.

El Salvador: The estimate includes 35,000 cooperative members on the Phase I estates and 39,936 applicants for individual land parcels under Decree 207 as of December 1983 (Deere, 1984). The figure probably overestimates the total number of beneficiaries since only 252 applicants under Decree 207 have actually received definitive land titles. The number of rural households in 1983 was estimated as 624,386.

Table 2. Women in the Latin American Agrarian Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>% WOMEN BENEFICIARIES</th>
<th>BENEFICIARY CRITERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>n.d.*</td>
<td>individuals over 16; any age if have dependent; men or women farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>individuals over 18 if feudatario; over 14 if married; widows with children may receive land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>26% (1983)</td>
<td>individuals; state policy goal to incorporate women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>individuals over 18; preference to household heads with most dependents &amp; most efficient farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>individuals; point system favored farming experience, education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>individuals over 18; preference to household heads with most dependents and farming experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>3.8% (1979)</td>
<td>16 yrs. if single male; any age if married male; single or widowed women with children may apply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>heads of household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>18 yrs., heads of household with dependent children, agriculturalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>18 yrs. &amp; married or effective heads of household; point system, favored &quot;aptitude&quot; for agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>6% (1982)</td>
<td>individual; an objective of agrarian reform to incorporate women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*n.d. = no data available
SOURCES FOR TABLE 2

Mexico: Anaya 1976: chpt. 9
Bolivia: Jemio 1973: 42 (Article 78 of A.R. Law)
Cuba: Collins, Benjamin, and Scott 1984: chpt. 13
Venezuela: Guerrero 1962 (Articles 104, 63 of A.R. Law)
Costa Rica: Escoto 1965: 11
Dominican Republic: CEDEE 1983; Castro, Grullon and Leon 1983
Chile: Garrett 1982b
Ecuador: Redclift 1978
Peru: Deere 1982b (Article 84 of A.R. Law)
Nicaragua: CIERA 1984: chpt. 2
El Salvador: Simon, Stephens, and Diskin 1982, Appendix I
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