IPE beyond Western paradigms
China, Africa, and Latin America in comparative perspective

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Introduction

Political economy is about the sources of political power and its uses for economic ends. As power distribution varies around the globe, so does economic development and its approach to it. As Benjamin Cohen puts it, “the field of International Political Economy (IPE) teaches us how to think about the connections between economics and politics beyond the confines of a single state” (Cohen 2008: 1). However, not all the states look alike. When Cohen proposed a global conversation within the field of IPE he centered on American and British IPE, and in English spoken authors and approaches he only explored the construction of IPE in the Anglo-Saxon world. In the same line, in the last decades several authors started to reflect about academic fields like International Relations (IR) and IPE, in close connection with the growing development that the field had around the globe. This development has spurred a number of critical approaches about Western approaches in both IR (Eagleton-Pierce 2009; Schmidt 1998; Tickner 2003) and IPE but in this field more incipient (Chin, Pearson, and Yong 2013; Tussie 2015) that strive to develop new lines of research that bring other perspectives to the center of the scene, constructing alternative contributions to those imposed or disseminated from the centers of world power. Thus, lately, some relevant studies have emerged on the place that national and regional schools occupy within social sciences and the work of numerous scholars has aimed at making them more ”global” (Acharya 2014; Cohen 2008; Helleiner 2014; Phillips and Weaver 2011; Tussie 2015).

As ideas and knowledge travel, so do disciplines. The way IPE developed in the Anglo-Saxon world had set the main bases to its study in other regions of the world centering the attention on the way markets and power operate worldwide. However, when approaching the way IPE developed “outside the mainstream” particularities emerge, and a whole set of conceptualizations and questions arose that differ in a great manner from those in the developed world. Markets and power are both main concerns in the capitalist world we live in but the way we think about that interaction changes if we are on one side of the globe or the other(s). Inquiries, ideas, and analysis in the Global South are proof of that. Thinking capitalism from the core – namely Europe and the US – has a completely different approach than thinking it from the South. Problems and approaches vary if you are from developed countries or if you are from
developing or emerging countries, if you are a rule maker or a rule taker, if you are a creditor or a debtor, if you are inserted in the global economy as a producer of manufactures or a commodity exporter.

This led us to another question. In this framework, should IPE be global? Can IPE be global? Do we need it to be global? Globalizing fields of research can also be a trap. As globalization itself became a way of homogenization and Westernization of the rest of the world, making disciplines more global (although it has good intentions) could also be, on one hand, the way the mainstream comprises concepts and ideas from other regions of the world but does nothing with them. On the other hand, it could also be the way the mainstream embrace concepts and ideas from other regions of the world but do nothing with them. In this vein, we can think of IPE as being global in its subject study, but we can question its globalizing scope showing the risk that it has for the field and the way different parts of the world approach it. Making it global can also mean making the Global South problems more diffuse, blurry, and imperceptible, which can imply that the only ones capable of thinking about and developing solutions to those problems are the same ones that cause them.

In this chapter we will address the way IPE developed outside the mainstream, in the Global South, focusing on the case studies of Africa, Asia, and particularly China and South America. Bringing into light the way IPE has been approached in these regions of the world will allow us to identify problems, ideas, and concerns different from those in the North and that also place attention on the necessity of conscious reading of these works in order to find suitable solutions to the market–power dynamics affecting “the rest of the world.” It seeks to resume the contributions made by IPE in the Global South to the construction of a research agenda on IPE beyond the West (and North). First, we will discuss the aim of making IPE a global field and the limits of the global conversation. Afterwards, we will approach the way IPE developed in Africa, China and South America. Finally, conclusions based on a comparison of these diverged approaches will follow.

In methodological terms, for the analysis we will focus on the agents of knowledge production (academics and specialists) as well as the spaces (institutions, networks, publications) where the specialized knowledge about IPE was developed in the Global South. It seeks to identify institutions, networks, people, and knowledge that influenced the formulation of new approaches to IPE. Among the spaces studied, we will consider first topics and main debates in IPE for each region; then universities, as areas of training and dissemination of knowledge; public and private institutions of knowledge production; and networks that stimulated the proliferation of international studies at the national level (Altamirano and Sarlo 1997; Buchbinder 2005; Clark 1997). Finally, the agents considered will be intellectuals specialized in the production of knowledge, both for academic debate and for the state (Altamirano and Sarlo 1997; Plotkin and Zimmermann 2012).

**IPE and the limits of the global conversation**

Political economy has always been part of IR (Cohen 2008) and, as such, IPE (and IR in general) has been considered a discipline designed by and especially outlined by the experiences and problems of the US and European central countries. This determined not only who dominated the field but also with which tools. In recent years, this deep and ponderous intellectual dominance led several academics from different parts of the world to the task of developing their own approaches or recovering local and regional ones to offer a broader vision of the discipline alerted by its narrowness and the denial of the existence of other voices, experiences, knowledge, and perspectives from outside the centers. Thus, it has exposed the limitations of theories
and approaches developed by the centers to explain – and especially to modify – the realities of the periphery. Therefore, the reflection has focused on the circulation of knowledge between center and periphery and how that circulation has marked the form IPE has developed in other parts of the world.

It is known that IPE has achieved its greatest development in the English-speaking world, both in methodological and theoretical terms. As Benjamin Cohen (2008) points out, “globally, the dominant version of IPE (we might even say the hegemonic version) is one that has developed in the United States, where most scholarship tends to hew close to the norms of conventional social science” (Cohen 2008: 3) and where “the other” is British IPE (Blyth 2009; Phillips and Weaver 2011). As a result, geographically, on one hand, Anglo-Saxon academia became the reference point for the development of IPE in the world, while on the other hand, the study of “the other” has been focused on the transatlantic dialogue and British IPE. Theoretically, the conversation tends to leave behind Marxism, critical IPE studies, and many idiosyncratic views that neither dialogue with the North nor incorporate their methodological standards.

To make this scenario even more complex, in the Global South the adoption of theories and ideas from the centers were largely adopted indiscriminately without taking into account the structural differences between the two spaces. However, even when compared with what happened in Anglo-Saxon countries, the study of IPE in the Global South may seem relatively recent, it is certainly not absent or completely new. While the development of IPE in Anglo-Saxon countries was due to challenges arising from the dynamics between markets and power, in the other regions of the world the field and its main formulations developed associated to the emergence of real challenges from both the international economic scenario and the different strategies of insertion in the global economy developed by those regions. IPE in the South has been marked by the struggle for economic development, access to credit, debt payment, regional integration to access a better international insertion, and adding value to its exports. These concerns put the focus on different necessities and required different approaches from those of developed countries to understand their realities.

Box 27.1 IPE in Anglo-Saxon countries

While the development of IPE in Anglo-Saxon countries was due to challenges arising from the dynamics between markets and power, in the other regions of the world the field and its main formulations developed associated to the emergence of real challenges from both the international economic scenario and the different strategies of insertion in the global economy developed by those regions. IPE in the South has been marked by the struggle for economic development, access to credit, debt payment, regional integration to access a better international insertion, and adding value to its exports.

The discussion on the place that the Global South plays in mainstream debates has been mainly addressed by IR scholars. Several authors have pointed out the narrowness of IR theory that has arisen from the Western world centers that does not serve to explain the reality of those located in the periphery because they left aside voices, experiences, knowledge, and perspectives from outside of the centers (Acharya 2014; Acharya and Buzan 2010; Bilgin 2008; Thomas and Wilkin 2004; Tickner 2003; Tickner and Wæver 2009). For this reason, in recent years we have witnessed a great reflexivitiy among IR scholars in an attempt to incorporate a new agenda for
research or to bring other IR perspectives to the center of the stage, different from those imposed from the Anglo-Saxon world. Thus, many scholars gathered around the need to outline a global agenda centered on the place regional and national schools have within the IR field (Deciancio 2016a).

This attempt has barely occurred within IPE (Lavelle 2005; Shaw 1975). However, some efforts have been made among scholars in the Global South to think IPE differently and bring into light the specificity of the field to think their own realities, understand them, and design their own solutions to them. The following sections are an attempt to summarize the main characteristics of IPE in Africa, China, and Latin America.

IPE in Africa

**Box 27.2 African IPE**

Although African IPE is quite new, going back into the roots of IR ideas and concepts allows to trace many African contributions to IPE from the Global South ignored by mainstream Western IPE. Contributions on decolonization, development, and the political economy of foreign aid brings into the discussion how the relation between markets and politics operate from the perspective of debtors instead of creditors, and the implications that has for the insertion of Global South economies into the world.

African IPE has been almost unexamined and disciplinary reflections are mostly invisible. Although IPE as a field of research – as considered in Western universities – is quite new in African research institutions, studies on development and political and economic relations date to the 1960s when International Relations was institutionalized as a discipline. In fact, development studies pioneered the studies of IR along with debates on decolonization. As it takes place in the Latin American case, in Development Studies a political economy dimension was present from the beginning but not considered within Western/mainstream IPE as part of the field. Structural and institutional factors were assigned a key role in the development process. As Ohiorhenuan and Keeler (2015) pointed out, in the initial phase of the field, the state was also assigned a large role in promoting development almost as a historical imperative. Dependency theorists of the 1960s and 1970s explicitly introduced an international political dimension to analyses of the asymmetric relationships between the industrial primary producing countries (Ohiorhenuan and Keeler 2015). As such, Development Studies considered within the wider definition of IPE have a long tradition in Africa. Questions of poverty, development, and underdevelopment have always been central in the debates concerning IPE in Africa (Nkiwane 2001).

Addressing the African case brings us a big challenge. First of all, we are aware that the first problem to analyze the development of IPE in Africa is the sole idea of taking the continent as a whole. Doing this leaves aside the particularities of each country and the way knowledge developed in each place. However, it is difficult for those studying individual African countries to separate their analyses from wider circumstances on the continent. In order to have a more comprehensive approach to our subject, we will address African IPE as a case taking into account the general common ground where the field is grounded. The study of political issues cannot be separated from the examination of economic issues, and vice versa. Also, as it has been said...
before, an IPE approach cannot leave aside the local, the national, the regional, and the inter-
national levels of analysis. Second, African IPE has been analyzed more from outside the contin-
ent (Beckman and Adeoti 2006; Shaw 1975; Smith 2009) than from within, often defined and
oriented by the dominant international and geopolitical agendas of the day (Taylor and Williams
2004).

African involvement in world economy has been addressed from multiple perspectives
within the Western IR, especially considering its relevance in terms of political and economic
stability and access to natural resources (Geldenhuys 2015; Lavelle 2005). In Western IR,
although they haven’t been completely absent, African states have not constituted the core
theoretical concern of either IR or IPE. The lack of attention of the IR field is still surprising.
Where there have been attempts at bringing Africa into the fold, it has been done from the
perspective of “what can Western IR do to incorporate Africa,” rather than “what can we
learn from Africa” (Smith 2009). In this sense, as Nkiwane (2001) pointed out, exploring IR
– and IPE – contributions from Africa offers a powerful understanding of the functioning of
states and markets, as well as the potential for their failure. In fact, the literature on colonial-
ism and imperialism in Africa existed parallel to the development of mainstream Western IR
but left aside by it.

Africa needs the world economy due to the nature of the aid regime, which requires African
states to engage in world markets; while the world economy does not need African production,
which remains mainly agricultural. At the same time, as Shaw (1975) pointed out, while colon-
ization made Africa part of the global economy; we cannot understand its political economy or
its political (lack of) development without reference to the strategies of collaboration or con-
frontation adopted by African regimes to their situation. Reliance on external associations and
support may bring short-term gains but it replaces reliance on a domestic constituency with
dependence on foreign interests (Shaw 1975). At present, “neocolonialism” in its modern and
changing forms continues to determine Africa’s development and underdevelopment, leading to
increased inequalities on the continent. The African debate has been best exemplified by the
question of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), as advocated by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and whether Africa has reached a “post-adjustment” period
(Nkiwane 2001).

In 1975, Tim Shaw lamented himself for the state of IPE field in Africa, by then, he was
concern about:

i) the relative inattention afforded to the impact of international politics on the rate and
direction of social change in African states; ii) the need for a new conceptual framework to
advance our understanding of the linkage politics between African elites and external inter-
ests; and iii) the related growth and international inequalities on the continent.

(Shaw 1975: 29)

Almost 50 years from then little has changed. One of the most problematic aspects of the posi-
tion of Western IR theorists from the point of view of a variety of African scholars is with regard
to the marriage of the propagation of democracy to foreign economic and political penetration.
The debate on structural adjustment in Africa has outlined this concern most clearly. The hostil-
ity with which international financial institutions have approached the question of state inter-
vention in Africa has been the subject of much discussion, particularly with respect to the
economic, social, and political effects of structural adjustment on the continent (Nkiwane
2001).
The main change was during the postwar and postcolonial era, when world systems theory and “development studies” considered Africa as part of the debate. These investigations acknowledged that the economic governance structures of the former colonial metropole directed the postcolonial economies (Lavelle 2005). However, development studies have always been separated from IPE, and African countries were only included in the analysis as “case studies” but not as agents of knowledge production. After political independence, the preoccupation was the search for economic and social independence. To escape from underdevelopment, African regimes need increased domestic control to advance their strategy of international confrontation (Shaw 1975). During the 1970s, debates within African IPE were mainly focused on inequalities but the orthodox paradigm were more preoccupied with notions of modernization, political capacity, and political responsiveness, and with concepts of development, adaptation, integration, and unity.

In the 1990s, the centrality of the neoliberal economic argument has been challenged from African IPE with a pragmatic perspective, after over two decades of liberal market reform throughout much of Africa. The belief in the positive power and effects of markets alleviating the African economic condition is open to empirical contestation. There is no firm consensus on the effects of liberal market reforms in Africa, but a powerful and growing African perspective argues that these reforms have not only failed to improve the African condition, but they made it worse (Ake 1995; Amin 1996). The importance of this perspective as a criticism of the liberal paradigm cannot be overstated, because if true the liberal assumption in IR of open markets offering opportunities for mutual gain will of necessity be open to question (Nkiwane 2001).

In the last decades, African IPE responded to the specificity of African economies, marked by the participation of foreign actors in their economic structure. Foreign aid marked a strong part of African IPE in the last decades. It is a significantly higher ratio of foreign capital inflows to Africa than any other region: 87 percent compared to an average of 54 percent for all developing countries, and it is also a significantly higher ratio of GDP: 19 percent compared to an average of 3 percent for all developing countries (Ohiorhenuan and Keeler 2015). The three main focus of analysis have been, in the first place, the political and economic implications of foreign aid specially focused on the administration of these funds and the political and economic implications they have in the continent (Goldsmith 2001). On the other hand, the actors involved in the administration of the funds also differs from other regions of the world. Compared to Latina America or Asia, a big percentage of capital entering and exiting African economies either is mediated by public-sector organizations and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or is not captured in official statistics at all (Lavelle 2005).

Although African IPE is quite new, going back into the roots of IR’s ideas and concepts allows to trace many African contributions to IPE from the Global South ignored by mainstream Western IPE. Contributions on decolonization, development, and the political economy of foreign aid brings into the discussion how the relation between markets and politics operate from the perspective of debtors instead of creditors, and the implications that has for the insertion of Global South economies into the world. Political stability has been one of the main concerns of African countries since decolonization, strongly bound to the effects of economic development and the need for financial support to gain this goal.
IPE in China

Box 27.3 IPE in China

Looking within China there is a diversity of IPE views, but three concepts have been key in Chinese IPE: development, hegemony, and globalization. Those concepts are related to the Chinese need to respond to changes in official policy and the norms of the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

As China’s influence in the world is increasingly important, it is central to understand the underpinnings of its International Political Economy. Though the IPE field started to develop in the 1970s and took off in the mid-1980s it was not until the 1990s that it got around in China. Song (2001) attributed the neglect of IPE in China to the following reasons: mutual isolation of universities from research institutions in a situation in which scholars studying international politics knew little about international economy and vice versa, and an approach based on policy-oriented research and applied studies given that academic research in China has a close link with national policies. In this sense, the Marxist theoretical approach was central until the 1990s when Western IPE as a set of concepts caught up quickly among Chinese scholars.

There was a level of academic insularity in China that was understandable, given the relative and limited involvement in international markets that the country experienced in the 1970s and 1980s (Zweig and Zhimin 2007). In this sense, according to Breslin (2007) the dominant approaches to studying China’s international relations overemphasize the national level of analysis and build on statist and realist notions of international relations that also reflected in the way in which IPE has emerged as a field of enquiry within China itself. Most academic explanations of China’s reforms, and even its foreign policy, have been based on domestic politics. Song (2001) argues that “the divides which separate disciplines and institutions are still very deep in China.” This is a consequence of the social setting in which the study of IR and IPE in China takes place – namely, the dominance of policy-related research, the residual ideology, and the fact that the state remains a very powerful force in contemporary China. In combination, these factors reinforce the separation of disciplines and have obstructed the emergence of an IPE that considers the importance of non-state actors and economics in general (Breslin 2007).

Nonetheless, some ideas have gained traction and influence, but there are also important differences in the basic assumptions of IPE in the West. Particularly, the roots in Marxist thinking as the official doctrine since 1949 and China’s socialist economy were simply too powerful, preventing changes in global prices or international economic forces from affecting domestic prices, domestic supply, and demand. In fact, due to China’s fixed currency and even the East Asian Financial Crisis, which toppled leaders across Southeast Asia and triggered structural economic reforms, had a limited impact on China’s economic development (Zweig and Zhimin 2007). According to Chin, Pearson, and Yong (2013) the enduring influence of Marxist political economy was related to the fact that the approach dominated the analysis of all major social sciences and that the think tanks that have a Marxist approach, such as the Institute for Marxism at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), receive privileged funding from the state.

The global rise of China and particularly China’s “open policy,” and its deeper engagement with the global economy allowed a more suitable environment for Western IPE to become known by Chinese scholars. In the 1990s a new momentum, triggered by the new promotion to a higher level of the open-door policy supported by Deng Xiaoping in order to open up
China to foreign investments vis-à-vis a high speed economic growth, allowed the opportunity to introduce IPE. Concepts such as globalization and interdependence were widely discussed in China and given its more open strategy, and IPE escaped the typical fate of Western international relations theories that usually were suspected, selectively introduced, criticized, and modified (Wenli 2001).

In general, the development of IPE in China is divided into three phases: the first one that lasted until the 1990s, in which a Marxist view and structuralist ideas dominated the field. A second stage started in the 1990s in which the field was institutionalized when the Ministry of Education recognized IPE as one of the subjects to study within international politics and diplomacy (Cohen 2019). Although the first texts on IPE lean on a classical Marxist view (Song and Yue 1999), the following ones began to incorporate Western ideas (Chen, Angling, and Yugui 2001; Fan 2001) as the IPE field blossomed in many universities. A third stage began in the 2000s when Western IPE was fully incorporated into Chinese academia that shares similarities with the Global North debates.

Looking within China there is a diversity of IPE views, but three concepts have been key in Chinese IPE: development, hegemony, and globalization. Those concepts have been related to the Chinese need to respond to changes in official policy and the norms of the governing CCP. In this sense, we agree with Chin, Pearson, and Yong (2013) that Chinese IPE is powerfully induced by political power and the role of the CCP defining the parameters of the policy and academic debate that are closely intertwined and that set ideas as the dominant and correct approach.

Chinese IPE has been reluctant to a benevolent view of hegemony, according to Wenli (2001) this resistance is based on various idiosyncratic factors that are key in China. First, in Chinese cultural values hegemony is always related to oppression and selfishness and it is usually assessed in a coercive fashion. Second, China did not suffer the same experience as Western countries in terms of a hegemonic power providing public goods and win–win competition for the world system; given that Chinese enterprises joined the world economic system in the 1980s raising protectionism and trade barriers were common in world trade. Third, when the United States had the chance to adjust the international economic system after the end of the Cold War, it rarely acted as a benign hegemon eager to sustain free trade. Given this experience, Chinese academia was reluctant to address a benevolent view of hegemony. Nonetheless, the view of hegemony has evolved from a critical view that analyzed this concept as imperialism–based on Marxist ideas to a more power politics concept in the 1990s, reaching a more recent benevolent view in the 2000s (Chin, Pearson, and Yong 2013).

The key role that political power played in shaping Chinese IPE is reflected in the way that the term globalization was addressed in academia. This concept appeared in the 1990s since the introduction of China’s “open policy,” and its deeper engagement with the global economy. Since this term started to be used by official authorities in the mid-1990s, scholars of Chinese IR and IPE began to analyze the challenges and opportunities presented by economic globalization.

International forces strengthened the local state in the 1980s and 1990s, while the remarkable opening following China’s World Trade Organization accession undermined state power at all levels of the system (Zweig and Zhimin 2007). Chinese admit globalization of economic activities, environmental issues, and information techniques but are reluctant to political, cultural, and social dimensions of globalization. Since the state is still at the center of Chinese IPE they reject the idea that that national frontiers have weakened and that national governments and nation states have lost control of the political economic life (Wenli 2001).

Breslin (2007) argues that, on one hand, nationalism was at the heart of the reform process initiated by Deng Xiaoping, legitimized by the need to build a strong China that could resist and
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oppose the existing hegemonic global order. On the other hand, the resurgence of nationalism in China is partly explained by a new sense of pride in China’s economic successes and a feeling that key external groups have been trying to prevent China’s development and threaten Chinese interests.

In terms of modes of development, Chinese IPE discusses whether external forces will drive China’s regime, or whether the CCP and China’s bureaucrats will shape these external forces. State-led development models, particularly in East Asia, suggest that bureaucrats can manage the external environment and control the direction of economic development (Breslin 2007). According to Wenli (2001), when China began its economic reform in the 1980s there were already three dominant modes of development: The Anglo-Saxon dominated by Great Britain and the US, The West European exemplified by France and Scandinavian countries, and the Asian mode represented by Japan. The Asian mode became the most popular with Chinese intellectuals, particularly because Western countries completed industrialization under favorable geographical and historical conditions that could not be replicated. Conversely, the East Asia experience offered a more suitable way to catch up in terms of modernization. This triggered a rich debate among Chinese scholars and the Asian mode assumed considerable importance to address Chinese economic reform at least until the Asian financial crisis.

In sum, Chinese IPE presents three main characteristics. First, a close link between Chinese IPE and the statist view of the CCP, there is a strong policy orientation in which IPE is not only a field of study but also a normative and practical ground similar to dependency theory in Latin America. Second, in the case of China, ongoing integration of global and Western IPE theory may well involve a deep questioning of the most fundamental categories assumed in Western IR and IPE such as state, market, and civil society (Hurrell 2016). In this sense, Chinese response and critique to Western IPE is the main way to develop the Chinese IPE field. Third, this debate allows a significant diversity in current Chinese IPE that ranges from Marxian political economy to more mainstream perspectives that address IPE in Western terms.

IPE in South America

Box 27.4 Until the 1980s, IPE has been marked by …

Until the 1980s, IPE has been marked by the studies on regional integration and regionalism, constituting also one of the main contributions of Latin America to global IR and with a clear Southern perspective.

Diana Tussie (2015) points out that, in Argentina and South America, IPE had two strong pushes: the first, initiatory, marked by the impulse of the Dependency theory; and another more recent, in the 1990s, with the creation of Mercosur and regional blocs. This second stimulus gave a less deterministic tone to academic research that at the same time approached a dialogue and a more intimate interaction with public policy. Both show the great amount of changes that have marked the development of the studies, granting them their own characteristics and altering their course (Tussie 2015). This approach to IPE and theoretical developments transcended national borders to become a phenomenon of regional scale. That is why it wouldn’t be accurate to address these contributions as exclusively of one nation, although much of the debate was driven by Raúl Prebisch, an Argentine intellectual. Though, since its beginnings, Latin American IPE has been a phenomenon that developed at the regional level and that stimulated studies
on this and other branches of the discipline in many of the Latin American countries. Within this framework, the study of regions and regionalism acquired special relevance. This does not imply that this has been the only contribution of Latin American IPE but it has been the one that emerged as one of the most relevant research issues within IR discipline, along with the more preponderant studies of foreign policy and international security (Deciancio 2018). Latin American versions of Developmental Sociology and Developmental Economics, based on structuralism, critical sociology, and dependency theory, were expressions of the ability of social scientists in the region to confront dominant ideas in the international debate questioning conventional wisdom and transforming it to reinvent it (Tussie 2015).

Since the late nineteenth century, Social Sciences have been influenced by the region’s structural conditions such as resources, political instability, and economic crisis. Since the economic crisis that affected South American countries at the end of the nineteenth century, a body of specialists in Economics was consolidated, and institutions dedicated to the teaching of Economics emerged. As a result of these events, economists occupied the center of the scene when both the state and society began to demand tighter, expert knowledge able to identify what was happening, while at the same time they increasingly gained more legitimacy (Plotkin 2010).

In the Latin American IR field, attention has mainly been centered on such issues as the Cold War, Defense, and Security, and national and regional Foreign Policies with indifference and even denial about the gravity of economic forces and market operators. It is in part for this reason that IPE constantly puts into question the analyses that presume an excessive autonomy of economics over politics (Tussie 2015). For Guzzini, for example, IPE emerged as a reaction, partly in favor and partly against, the much more systemic – but restricted – neorealist IR theory proposed by Kenneth Waltz (Guzzini 1998). From Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx, Economics is considered eminently political, while at the same time politics is tied to economic phenomena. But IR did not make the factors and economic actors its center of attention until the fall of the Bretton Woods system and the devaluation of the dollar in 1973. The oil crisis contributed and brought into light the limitations of and started questioning the foundations – until then invisible – of the Western economic system. Concerns with economic decline and its debates opened the path for a greater confluence between IR and IPE in Latin America.

By the end of the 1970s, political economy gained strength from the discomfort of scholars with the distance between abstract models of political and economic behavior and what was really happening in Latin American economies and politics. At the same time, economic crises increasingly politicized Economics while concerns of political systems on economic factors started to increase (Frieden and Lake 2000).

In Latin America, Economics and Economic Sociology contributed to the development of an approach to IR where new actors and processes were included in a field that, as noted earlier, was traditionally centered on the state as the main actor and producer of international relations. The inclusion of economic variables and forces into the dynamics of foreign relations was mainly motivated, in its beginnings, by the regional integrationist proposals when the peripheral place of the region in international economic relations was assumed. As a result, from the first works of Argentine engineer Alejandro Bunge and his proposal to create a Southern Customs Union, to the integrationist project of the 1960s, led by Raúl Prebisch, a Latin American developmentalist, studies on regional integration have marked and promoted IPE in Latin America. As a result, by the middle of the twentieth century, center-periphery tensions established a new understanding of international politics. At the same time, the IR field started to be recognized as an autonomous discipline in the hands of its institutionalization in universities and a growing
sense of urgency regarding the political and economic dependence of the region emerged (Tickner 2003).

Until the 1980s, IPE has been marked by the studies on regional integration and regionalism, constituting also one of the main contributions of Latin America to global IR (Acharya 2011, 2014; Deciancio 2016b) and with a clear Southern perspective. In a way, to make a parallel with the European process, while the theory of European regional integration had its roots in Social Sciences, Latin American regional integration has its roots in Latin American political economy (Perrotta 2018) and more specifically, in a regional vision of IPE (Tussie 2015).

Perrotta (2018) argues that three schools are key in the development of IPE in South America – structuralism, dependency, and autonomy – and they have a close link when analyzing the practical problems that the region was experiencing. In this sense, the South American school of IPE developed particularly around practical topics (Ramos and Scotelaro 2018; Tickner 2008) and with an emphasis first on development and, since the 1980s, with a focus on regional integration given the failure of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) and its reconversion to the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI).

In the 2000s, new agendas and approaches to South American regionalism emerged, accompanying the creation of new regional organizations such as the Bolivarian Alliance of the People of Our Americas (ALBA), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). These regional groupings are characterized as “regionalism with adjectives” (Perrotta 2018) since the main labels that appeared are: postliberal (Chodor and McCarthy 2013; Sanahuja 2012), posthegemonic (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012; Schulz, Söderbaum, and Ojen 2001), and post-trade (Dabène 2012). These approaches delineated a new set of conceptualizations to explain the turn in policy. Since UNASUR and CELAC had a rich agenda of functional cooperation it opened up the studies of sectoral agendas of cooperation in regionalism, ranging from defense, drugs, and security (Battaglino 2012; Quiliconi and Rivera 2019), health (Herrero and Tussie 2015; Riggirozzi 2017), migration (Montenegro 2017), to infrastructure, energy, and environment (Dabène 2012; Palestini and Agostinis 2015). This new set of regional arrangements and the variety of issues and overlapping agendas led to a rich debate that addresses the kind of regionalism the region is experiencing (Gómez 2015; Nolte 2018; Quiliconi 2014; Quiliconi and Salgado 2017; Vadell 2018; Vivares 2014).

Latin American regionalism has been strongly linked to the economic and political cycles of the region. Likewise, and as Perrotta (2018) points out, the waves or cycles of this regionalism have been strongly linked to the organizations that have emerged alongside each of these moments. In this sense, the crisis and loss of dynamism of both the UNASUR, CELAC, and ALBA and their agendas based on premises of recovery of autonomy and the margins of South American development (Deciancio 2016b) give way to a moment where the most traditional agendas of trade integration will prevail with new regulatory elements that have already been incorporated by the countries that signed asymmetric Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and belong to the Pacific Alliance. Here, the IPE literature is opening a new debate about regulatory adjustments and deep integration in organizations with light or no institutional structures (Legler, Garelli-Ríos, and González 2018).

Conclusions

Robert Cox (1981: 128) pointed out that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.” In the case of the regions addressed in this chapter we have demonstrated that IPE’s locally grounded theory has sought to speak for excluded and marginalized groups in the case of Africa,
Marxism and the state in the case of China, and development and the public sector for Latin America. The main issue is that traditional IPE grounded in the North does not consider this type of debate as part of the IPE field. Given that mercantilism, liberalism, and Marxism have been considered as the underpinning of current IPE, and most of the Global South ideas have been neglected in IPE debates. For this reason, reflections like this chapter are encouraging a great reflexivity among IPE scholars in an attempt to incorporate a new agenda for research or to bring other IPE perspectives from the Global South to light. Thus, many scholars gathered around the need to outline a global agenda centered on the place regional and national schools have within the IR and IPE fields (Deciancio 2016a).

Proof of the lack of recognition of alternatives tradition is that Cohen (2019), in his recent reedition of the book *Advanced Introduction to International Political Economy*, diagnoses that the Latin American state of IPE is unproductive, fragile, and anemic, only citing a few academics in that tradition that have recently published on IPE and selecting most of the ones that lived and worked in the Global North. In the case of China, Cohen (2019) recognizes that even though the field is thriving, the field has not managed to provide any transformational contribution. Unfortunately, he does not address at all the state of the field in Africa. In our view his assessment of IPE has a bias toward recognizing theories that come from the North and neglects the contribution of IPE from the Global South due to little knowledge of how the field is developing in those regions.

Particularly, in the case of Latin America, the IPE field is prospering with a new generation of scholars that have finished their PhDs in the Global North and have returned to the region to work in local universities, propelling a thriving debate particularly in issues such as regionalism, development, and finance and also creating new PhDs programs that are producing new generations of scholars entirely educated in the region with high standards. Just a few countries that are examples of this trend are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico. Similar trends are taking place in China and Africa even though in Africa the development of the field is still incipient. Table 27.1 compares the main characteristics of non-Western IPE in the regions addressed in this chapter.

**Table 27.1 Non-Western IPE in comparison**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions/dimensions</th>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Theoretical approaches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Decolonization, Foreign aid</td>
<td>Policy-oriented, qualitative</td>
<td>Marxism, decolonial studies, mainstream IPE (specially from studies made from abroad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marxism, and recently mainstream IPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Hegemony, globalization, development</td>
<td>Policy-oriented, qualitative</td>
<td>Marxism, structuralism, recently new eclectic approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Development and regionalism</td>
<td>Policy-oriented, qualitative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Authors’ own elaboration.*
Bibliography


